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(1-36)  
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TITLE:

INTERNAL SECURITY OF JORDAN.

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TO  
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Mr. Macrae

(16-17)

18/2

Reg

Mr. Macrae

18-19

18/2

Reg

Mr. Macrae

20

20/2

Reg

P. Hinchcliffe

21/22

18/2

Mr. Gray

21

20/2

PH

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25/2

Reg

C. Long

(26-27)

3/3

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Mr. EVANS

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(33-34)

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NEXT FILE: NET 1/6

**OTHER RELATED FILES:**\_\_\_\_\_

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Form 34

Instructions on completing this form are in Office Instructions—MOD Manual 2

FROM COL GS DE A PD REFERENCES PD ALPHA PD CX/014541 DATED 16 DEC 69 PD  
BRAVO PD YOUR MA/A101 PARA 2 DATED 19 DEC 69 PD SUBJECT 3 ARMORED DIVISION AND  
INTERNAL SECURITY PD IS IT INTENDED THAT 40 AND 60 ARMORED BRIGADES ARE TO BE  
WITHDRAWN FROM THEIR PRESENT ROLE OF SUPPORT TO 1 AND 2 INFANTRY DIVISIONS AND  
ARE TO BE HELD CENTRALLY FOR USE UNDER COMMAND 3 DIVISION FOR ITS ROLE PD THIS  
INTENTION IS INDICATED IN REF ALPHA PD IF SO PLEASE LET ME HAVE YOUR VIEWS ON  
EFFECT THIS WILL HAVE ON INFANTRY DIVISIONS PARTICULARLY FROM THE POINT OF VIEW  
OF MORALE OF THE INFANTRY BRIGADES FACING ISRAEL PD DOES THE FORMATION OF 3  
ARMORED DIVISION EVER BEEN DISCUSSED FOR MANY MONTHS EVER INDICATE ANY RECENT  
RE-ASSESSMENT OF AN INCREASED THREAT TO INTERNAL SECURITY AND TO REGIME FROM  
FIDAYEH PD REQUIREMENT FOR CONCENTRATION OF ALL AVAILABLE ARMOUR IN THE IS  
PENCE IS NOT CLEAR IN THE CONTEXT OF A THREAT SOLELY FROM THE FIDAYEH UNLESS A  
THREAT FROM THE IRAQI BRIGADES IN JORDAN IS ALSO ENVISAGED IN CONJUNCTION WITH A  
THREAT FROM THE FIDAYEH PD REQUEST YOUR INITIAL VIEWS BY MONDAY 12 JAN IF  
POSSIBLE OR SUMMARY BY SIGNAL AT SAME DATE

Note: Messages comprising five or more pages must be collated

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
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SECRET - GUARD

IMMEDIATE AMMAN

TO MINISTRY OF DEFENCE (UK)

TEL NO. 090938Z JAN



SECRET AND GUARD.

FCO PASS IMMEDIATE TO DEFENCE COMMCEN FOR MOD D14 RFI FCO.

FOH 090938Z JAN FROM DA AMMAN

FOR COL GS. MOD TEL FOH 070945Z JAN (NOT TO FCO) REFERS.

ALPHA. THERE ARE NO INDICATIONS THAT FORTY AND SIXTY ARMD BDES ARE TO BE WITHDRAWN FROM PRESENT ROLE IN SUPPORT OF FORWARD DIVISIONS BUT NEW GROUPING WILL ALLOW WITHDRAWAL OF UNITS FOR IS PURPOSES IN THE FUTURE IF REQUIRED. WE CONSIDER THAT ANY WHOLE-SALE WITHDRAWAL WOULD IMPAIR MORALE OF FORWARD TROOPS CONSIDERABLY AND WOULD ONLY TAKE PLACE IN AN EMERGENCY. IT IS ENVISAGED THAT ONE OR TWO UNITS MAY BE LOCATED IN OR NEAR AMMAN ON A ROTATIONAL BASIS AND FOR TRAINING, BUT THIS CANNOT BE CONSIDERED EXCEPTIONAL.

BRAVO. WE SEE FORMATION OF THIRD ARMoured DIVISION AS NATURAL OUTCOME OF ARMoured FORCES NOW AVAILABLE TO USE CRAC HQ AS NUCLEUS OF DIVISIONAL HQ SEEMS LOGICAL. WHAT IS INTERESTING IS THAT COMMAND OF THIS DIVISION BY A MEMBER OF THE ROYAL FAMILY WILL ENABLE HM KING HUSSEIN TO HAVE A POWERFUL FORCE WHICH, ON HIS ORDERS CAN BE USED FOR IS PURPOSES, OR IN AN ANTI-COUP CONTEXT AGAINST DISSIDENT MILITARY FORCES.

CHARLIE. WE DO NOT CONSIDER THAT FORMATION OF THIRD ARMoured DIVISION SHOULD BE TAKEN IN ANY WAY TO INDICATE AN INCREASING

SECRET - GUARD

/THREAT



THREAT FROM FEDAYEEN GROUPS, OR TO THE REGIME, OR FROM IRAQI TROOPS WHO ARE NOW CLOSELY INTEGRATED WITH JORDANIAN TROOPS IN NORTH PART OF FRONT. WE CERTAINLY HAVE NO INDICATIONS OF INCREASING FRICTION WITH THE FEDAYEEN RATHER THE REVERSE.

FCO PASS IMMEDIATE TO DEFENCE COMMCEN FOR MOD D14.

SIR P.ADAMS

[SENT TO D.C.C.]

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EN CLAIR

IMMEDIATE AMMAN  
TELEGRAM NO 68

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH  
11 FEBRUARY

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✓  
FEB 1970  
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3

UNCLASSIFIED

ADDRESSED TO FCO TEL NO 68 DATED 11 FEBRUARY AND REPEATED  
FOR INFORMATION TO CAIRO, BEIRUT, TEL AVIV, BAGHDAD, MOSCOW,  
PARIS, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, JERUSALEM, MOD DI4, AND JIS  
N.E.

JORDAN INTERNAL - NEW SECURITY REGULATIONS.

THE FOLLOWING IS A SUMMARY OF NEW SECURITY REGULATIONS  
ISSUED ON 10 FEBRUARY:

1. THE VALIDITY OF CURRENT LAWS AND REGULATIONS IS UPHELD.,
2. INTERFERENCE WITH THE FREEDOM OF CITIZENS IS CONFINED  
TO THE LEGAL AUTHORITIES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LAW.
3. SECURITY OFFICIALS MUST NOT BE OBSTRUCTED IN THE  
PERFORMANCE OF THEIR LEGAL DUTIES.
4. ALL CITIZENS MUST CARRY THEIR PERSONAL IDENTITY CARDS AT  
ALL TIMES AND SHOW THEM TO SECURITY OFFICIALS WHEN ASKED.
5. FIRING IS FORBIDDEN WITHIN THE LIMITS OF THE CAPITAL,  
WHETHER FOR PRACTICE OR CELEBRATIONS.
6. IT IS FORBIDDEN TO BEAR ARMS IN TAXIS, BUSES, MOSQUES,  
CAFES CINEMAS ETC. THE "POPULAR RESISTANCE ORGANISATIONS"  
(I.E. THE "HOME-GUARD" UNDER ARMY COMMAND) ARE EXEMPT FROM  
THIS.
7. EXPLOSIVES AND AMMUNITION MUST NOT BE STORED WITHIN THE  
CAPITAL OR THE TOWNS. A PERIOD OF TWO WEEKS IS GIVEN TO  
COMPLY WITH THIS REGULATION.
8. ALL VEHICLES MUST CARRY AN OFFICIAL NUMBER PLATE - AGAIN  
A PERIOD OF TWO WEEKS IS ALLOWED FOR COMPLIANCE. VEHICLES  
NOT COMPLYING WILL BE CONFISCATED AND GIVEN TO THE "POPULAR  
RESISTANCE ORGANISATIONS".
9. ALL DEMONSTRATIONS AND MEETINGS ARE FORBIDDEN EXCEPT WITH  
PRIOR PERMISSION OF THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR.
10. ALL UNAUTHORISED PUBLICATIONS ARE FORBIDDEN.
11. PARTY POLITICAL ACTIVITIES ARE FORBIDDEN.
12. THE RAISING OF PRICES IS FORBIDDEN AND MERCHANTS ARE  
REQUIRED TO DISPLAY PRICES PROMINENTLY ON ALL GOODS.



2. SEE MY IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING TELEGRAM.

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE PASS ROUTINE TO PARIS, WASHINGTON  
AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

SIR P. ADAMS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

[PASSED TO M.O.D.]

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IMMEDIATE FROM AMMAN

TELEGRAM NO 69

CONFIDENTIAL

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

11 FEBRUARY 1970

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ADDRESSED TO FCO TELNO 69 OF 11 FEBRUARY REPEATED FOR INFORMATION (PRIORITY) TO BEIRUT, TEL AVIV N MOD D14, AND ROUTINE TO CAIRO BAGHDAD MOSCOW WASHINGTON TO UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS, JERUSALEM AND JIS N.E.

M.I.P.T. : JORDAN INTERNAL - SECURITY REGULATIONS.

SO FAR ALL IS QUIET, BUT THERE IS CONSIDERABLE UNDERLYING TENSION IN AMMAN.

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 14 FEB 1970 NEJ 1/1
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*for  
12/2*

2. ALTHOUGH FATAH RADIO IN CAIRO WAS QUICK TO WARN THAT IMPOSITION OF THESE NEW REGULATIONS COULD LEAD TO BLOODY CIVIL WAR IN JORDAN, THE RADIO HAS FREQUENTLY IN THE PAST BEEN OUT OF STEP WITH THE FATAH LEADERSHIP. NEVERTHELESS, THIS APPARENT THREAT FROM THE REGIME IS REPORTED TO<sup>have</sup> BROUGHT THE VARIOUS FEDAYEEN GROUPS TOGETHER IN A UNITED FRONT. WE HAVE YET TO GET DETAILS OF THIS.

3. YESTERDAY EVENING THE FEDAYEEN WERE REPORTED TO BE GATHERING IN THE DOWNTOWN AREA, BUT WERE REPORTEDLY DISPERSED PEACEFULLY ON INSTRUCTIONS OF FATA MILITARY POLICE. LOUD-HAILERS IN THE REFUGEE CAMPS HAVE BEEN URGING THE INMATES NOT TO SURRENDER THEIR ARMS, BUT THERE HAS BEEN NO TROUBLE. EARLY THIS MORNING CHECKPOINTS ON THE APPROACHES TO AMMAN WERE OPERATING VERY STRICTLY AND FEDAYEEN WERE SEEN BEING TURNED AWAY WITHOUT RESISTANCE.

4. IT IS TOO EARLY YET TO ASSESS PUBLIC REACTION TO THIS UNEXPECTED MOVE, BUT THE FEELING OF THOSE WE HAVE SO FAR CONTACTED IS THAT IF TROUBLE RESULTS IT IS LIKELY TO BE LIMITED. THE MAJORITY VIEW APPEARS TO LINK THE TIMING OF WHAT IS AFTER ALL NO MORE THAN A REAFFIRMATION OF "RULES", ALL OF WHICH WERE ALREADY THEORETICALLY IN FORCE, WITH THE KING'S RECENT VISIT TO CAIRO, WHERE IT IS THOUGHT HE MAY HAVE CLEARED THIS LINE OF ACTION WITH NASSER AND/OR ARAFAT, WITH THE PUTTING THE SQUEEZE ON THE SMALLER EXTREMIST GROUPS (SUCH AS THE ACTION ORGANISATION FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE WHICH MOUNTED THE GRENADE ATTACK AT MUNICH AIRPORT YESTERDAY).

/5.

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5. A MINORITY, HOWEVER, LINK THE MOVE WITH THE RECENT VISIT OF RASOUL KILANI, THE HARD-LINE MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR, TO THE LEBANON WHERE HE IS ASSUMED TO HAVE DISCUSSED CONTROL OF THE FEDAYEEN UNDER THE CAIRO AGREEMENT WITH THE LEBANESE AUTHORITIES. TO THESE, THE TIMING OF THIS MOVE, WHEN ARAFAT AND SEVERAL OF THE F.L.O. LEADERS ARE IN MOSCOW, APPEARS SINISTER.

FCO PASS PRIORITY DEFENCE COMMCEN, ROUTINE TO BAGHDAD, WTON MOSCOW, UKHIS NEW YORK, PARIS AND JERUSALEM.

DEFENCE COMMCEN PASS PRIORITY MOD DIA AND ROUTINE JIS N.E.

SIR F ADAMS

[ SENT TO D.C.C. ]

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CYPHER CAT A

IMMEDIATE FROM AMMAN

TO MINISTRY OF DEFENCE (U.K.)

TELEGRAM NO FOH 111815Z

FEBRUARY 1970

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ADDRESSED TO MOD DI 4 TELNO. FOH 111815Z OF FEBRUARY AND TO HQBFNE  
AND REPEATED IMMEDIATE FOR INFORMATION TO FCO, DA BEIRUT  
JIS (NE).

FROM DA AMMAN,

INTERNAL SECURITY SITUATION IN AMMAN.

DURING LATE AFTERNOON 11 FEB FEDAYEEN SEEN TO BE AT HIGH  
STATE OF READINESS WITH WEAPONS MOUNTED ON VEHICLES IN SOME  
CASES. RECCE AROUND TOWN AFTER DARK BETWEEN 111700Z AND  
111800Z REVEALED THAT SITUATION WAS TENSE WITH MANY ARMED  
MEN LURKING IN DOORWAYS. RECCE PARTY WAS FORCED TO MAKE  
DETOUR AT ONE PLACE WHERE A BARRIER OF STONES WAS BEING  
BUILT ACROSS A MAIN STREET LEADING TO JEBEL ASHRAFIA  
REFUGEE QUARTER WHOSE ENTRANCES APPEARED TO BE GUARDED  
BY FEDAYEEN. SOME FIRING TOOK PLACE IN STATION AREA IN  
SOUTHEAST QUARTER OF TOWN DURING LATE AFTERNOON 11 FEB.  
A PLATOON OF M 113 APC S WAS SOON MOVING AWAY FROM THIS  
AREA AT 111730Z .

CENTRE OF AMMAN APPEARS QUIET BUT THIS EVENING POPULATION IS  
TAKING UP QUOTE RINGSIDE SEATS UNQUOTE. IT IS CLEAR  
THAT INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES ARE FULLY ALERTED AND  
DEPLOYED.

FCO PASS IMMEDIATE TO DEFCONCEN.

DEFCONCEN PASS IMMEDIATE TO MOD DI 4 HQBFNE AND JIS (NE)

SIR P ADAMS

[SENT TO D.C.C.]

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IMMEDIATE FROM AMMAN

TO MOD DI4

TELEGRAM NO FOH 121630Z FEB

12 FEBRUARY 1970

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ADDRESSED TO MOD DI 4 TELEGRAM NO FOH 121630Z FEB AND TO  
FCO REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO HQBFNE, JIS (NE) AND  
DEFAT BEIRUT.

FROM DA AMMAN.

INTERNAL SECURITY SITUATION IN AMMAN.

NO FURTHER CLASHES REPORTED TODAY BUT TENSION REMAINED  
HIGH WITH PARTIES OF ARMED FEDAYEEN ROVING THE STREETS  
IN LANDROVERS. IS FORCES HAVE KEPT IN BACKGROUND BUT  
ARE VERY ALERT. IS FORCES AT ROAD CHECKPOINTS HAVE  
BEEN FURTHER REINFORCED.

LAST LIGHT RECCE 12 FEB SHOWED JEBEL ASHRAFIYEH AREA  
VIRTUALLY COMPLETELY SEALED OFF AND OCCUPIED BY  
FEDAYEEN WITH ENTRANCE ROADS HALF BLOCKED WITH STONES.  
ARMED PICKETS IN EVIDENCE IN MANY AREAS AND ANTI-TANK  
WEAPONS SEEN COVERING ROADS.

ARMY IS FORCES AT LAST LIGHT WERE MANNING VEHICLES AND  
CLEARLY AT VERY SHORT NOTICE TO MOVE.

SITUATION IS MORE TENSE THAN LAST NIGHT.

FCO PASS IMMEDIATE TO DEFCOMCEN

DEFCOMCEN PASS IMMEDIATE TO MOD DI4, HQBFNE AND JIS (NE).

SIR P ADAMS

[SENT TO D.C.C.].

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IMMEDIATE FROM AMMAN  
TELEGRAM NO 74

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
12 FEBRUARY 1970

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ADDRESSED TO FCO TELNO 74 OF 12 FEBRUARY REPEATED FOR  
INFORMATION (PRIORITY) TO BEIRUT AND TEL AVIV AND MOD DIA  
(ROUTINE) TO CAIRO, BAGHDAD, MOSCOW, WASHINGTON, UKMIS  
NEW YORK, PARIS, JERUSALEM, HQBFNE AND JIS NE.

JORDAN INTERNAL

THE SITUATION REMAINS TENSE AND CONFUSED BUT NORMAL ACTIVITY  
CONTINUES IN THE CITY.

2. AS REPORTED IN MY D.A.'S TELEGRAM NO 111815Z THERE  
WERE ONE OR TWO CLASHES BETWEEN FEDAYEEN AND SECURITY  
FORCES YESTERDAY EVENING AND THERE ARE REPORTS OF SEVERAL  
CASUALTIES ON BOTH SIDES.

3. THE KING MET FEDAYEEN LEADERS YESTERDAY EVENING AND  
THE OFFICIAL LINE IS THAT THE REGULATIONS ARE IN NO WAY  
INTENDED TO INTERFERE WITH THE MILITARY OPERATIONS OR  
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE FEDAYEEN BUT SIMPLY TO UPHOLD NORMAL  
CIVIL LAW AND ORDER.

4. THERE ARE UNFORTUNATELY ALMOST AS MANY THEORIES AS  
TO THE BACKGROUND TO ALL THIS AS WE HAVE LOCAL CONTACTS  
BUT JORDAN ARMY SOURCES PROFESS TO SEE IT AS A LOGICAL  
CONSEQUENCE OF A NUMBER OF ACTS OF LAWLESSNESS (SUCH AS  
KIDNAPPINGS AND ROBBERIES) BY ILL-DISCIPLINED FEDAYEEN  
AND SOMETIMES BY CRIMINALS POSING AS FEDAYEEN.

/5. MY

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- 2 -

5. MY AMERICAN COLLEAGUE HAS BEEN TOLD BY KING HUSSEIN THAT HE IS DETERMINED TO RESTORE LAW AND ORDER AND THAT ANYONE WHO GETS IN HIS WAY WILL GET HURT.

FCC PASS PRIORITY TO DEFCONCEN ROUTINE TO BAGHDAD, MOSCOW, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK PARIS AND JERUSALEM.

DEFCONCEN PASS PRIORITY TO MCD DI4 ROUTINE TO HQBFNE AND JIS NE.

SIR F ADAMS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

[SENT TO D.C.C.]

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8

ADDITIONAL NOTE FOR CABINET

12 February, 1970.

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INTERNAL SECURITY SITUATION IN AMMAN

Spending Notes [Defensive]

As a result of the re-issue of regulations concerning the carrying of arms, official identity documents etc. following King Hussein's return from Cairo, there is a tense security situation in Amman.

2. The fedayeen fear that these restrictions are aimed at them. In consequence they have taken some precautionary measures in case of a show-down with the authorities.

3. King Hussein has denied that the proposals are aimed at the fedayeen. However, it is difficult to see at whom they are aimed if not the fedayeen.

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EN CLAIR

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9

IMMEDIATE FROM AMMAN  
TELEGRAM NO 77

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
13 FEBRUARY 1970

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 10 13 FEB 1970 NEJ 1/1
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ADDRESSED TO FCO TEL NO 77 OF 13 FEBRUARY AND REPEATED FOR  
INFORMATION (PRIORITY) TO BEIRUT, TEL AVIV, MOD DI 4  
(ROUTINE) CAIRO, BAGHDAD, MOSCOW, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK,  
PARIS, JERUSALEM, HQBFNE AND JIS NE.

JORDAN INTERNAL:

PA  
Hossein  
... 7/6/2

AFTER A MEETING BETWEEN KING HUSSEIN AND FEDAYEEN LEADERS  
A COMMUNIQUE WAS BROADCAST ON AMMAN RADIO AT 1120 P.M. ON  
12 FEBRUARY.

FOLLOWING IS KEY SENTENCE:

QUOTE. THE MOST IMPORTANT THING AGREED UPON WAS THE  
CESSATION OF ALL PROVOCATIVE ACTIONS AND THE FREEZING  
OF ALL MEASURES AND CAUSES OF TENSION UNQUOTE.

2. FULL TEXT BY BAG.

FCO PASS ROUTINE WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK AND PARIS.

SIR P ADAMS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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IMMEDIATE FROM AMMAN

TO MINISTRY OF DEFENCE D14

TELEGRAM NO FOH 131115Z FEB

13 FEBRUARY 1970

RESTRICTED

ADDRESSED TO MOD DI 4 TELEGRAM NO FOH 131115Z REPEATED

FOR INFORMATION IMMEDIATE TO FCO, HQBFNE, JIS (NE)

DA BEIRUT

FROM DA AMMAN

INTERNAL SECURITY SITUATION IN AMMAN.

DURING THE NIGHT 12/13 FEB SPORADIC FIRING WAS HEARD, BUT OTHERWISE IT WAS A QUIET NIGHT. POLICE CARS WITH LOUDSPEAKERS TOURED AMMAN DURING THE NIGHT ANNOUNCING THE ABEYANCE OF THE NEW SECURITY REGULATIONS.

2. A TOUR OF AMMAN THIS MORNING SHOWED TRAFFIC FLOWING NORMALLY AND BUSINESS SEEMED TO BE AS USUAL. MANY FEDAYEEN ROAD BLOCKS HAVE BEEN REMOVED BUT SOME SIDE STREETS ARE STILL BLOCKED AROUND JEBEL ASHRAFIYA. FEDAYEEN, WHOSE ARMS IN ONE CASE INCLUDED A LOADED ROCKET LAUNCHER, CAN BE SEEN EVERYWHERE, WAVING TRAFFIC THROUGH ROAD BLOCKS, RIDING AROUND IN LANDROVERS AND CARRYING THEIR ARMS AS IN THE PAST. A JOINT ARMY/FEDAYEEN MOBILE POLICE PATROL HAS BEEN SEEN.

3. SOME EASING OF TENSION IS APPARENT BUT THE SITUATION COULD QUICKLY REVERT TO THAT OF YESTERDAY. PEOPLE IN THE STREETS DO NOT LOOK HAPPY AND THERE IS A GENERAL AIR OF DESPONDENCY AND ANTI-CLIMAX. NOT ONE WORD ABOUT THE SITUATION HAS BEEN SAID BY THE OFFICIAL JORDAN ARMY SPOKESMAN, AND THE DMI HAS BEEN UNOBTAINABLE ALL THIS WEEK.

/DEFENCE



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- 2 -

DEFENCE COMMCEN PASS IMMEDIATE TO MOD D14 HQBFNE AND JIS(NE)  
FCO PASS IMMEDIATE TO DEFENCE COMMCEN.

SIR P. ADAMS

[ SENT TO D.C.C. ]

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
IMMEDIATE FROM AMMAN TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
TELEGRAM NO 79 13 FEBRUARY 1970

PA  
Adm  
16/2

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ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 79 OF 13 FEBRUARY REPEATED  
FOR INFORMATION PRIORITY TO BEIRUT, TEL AVIV, MOD DIA,  
CAIRO, BAGHDAD, MOSCOW, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS,  
JERUSALEM AND JIS NE.

JORDAN INTERNAL



MY TELEGRAM NO 74. (7)

THE IMMEDIATE CRISIS IS OVER, AND NO DOUBT BOTH SIDES ARE  
NOW TAKING STOCK. I SHALL NOT ATTEMPT A DETAILED ASSESSMENT  
UNTIL THE DUST HAS SETTLED. THE GENERAL SITUATION CONTINUES  
TO BE UNEASY.

2. ON THE FACE OF IT THE EVENTS OF THE LAST TWO DAYS CAN  
HAVE GIVEN THE KING LITTLE COMFORT. IT IS HARD TO BELIEVE  
THAT IN LAUNCHING HIS DRIVE TO BRING THE FEDAYEEN UNDER  
TIGHTER CONTROL, HE ENVISAGED A FULL SCALE SHOWDOWN. BUT THE  
FEDAYEEN REACTION WAS SWIFT AND UNCOMPROMISING. THEY  
UNDOUBTEDLY SAW IN THE KING'S MOVE AN ATTEMPT TO ISOLATE  
THEIR FIELD FORCES, WHICH ARE DISPERSED OVER THE COUNTRYSIDE,  
PRINCIPALLY ON THE APPROACHES TO THE JORDAN RIVER, AND ERODE  
THEIR POSITION IN AMMAN WHICH, WITH ITS 400,000 PALESTINIANS,  
IS THEIR POWER BASE. THE VARIOUS FEDAYEEN GROUPS SHOWED  
UNPRECEDENTED UNITY., AN EARLY RECONNAISSANCE BY THE  
SECURITY FORCES RESULTED IN A SHARP CLASH AND BY YESTERDAY  
EVENING THE LARGEST AND MOST POPULOUS AREAS OF THE /CITY

CONFIDENTIAL



- 2 -

CITY WERE FIRMLY IN FEDAYEEN HANDS, WITH THE SECURITY FORCES CONCENTRATING IN POLICE STATIONS AND ON THE APPROACHES TO THE CITY. THE KING WAS THUS FACED WITH THE ALTERNATIVE OF SEEKING SOME SORT OF COMPROMISE OR OF LAUNCHING HIS ARMED FORCES ON AMMAN. WISELY, IN MY VIEW, HE APPEARS TO HAVE CHOSEN THE FORMER COURSE, AND IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHAT CONCESSIONS, IF ANY, HE HAS MANAGED TO EXTRACT FROM THE FEDAYEEN. AT FIRST SIGHT, HOWEVER, IT LOOKS VERY MUCH AS IF HE HAS HAD TO BACK DOWN AND THIS WILL BE SEEN AS A SEVERE SETBACK TO THE REGIME'S STANDING AND AUTHORITY.

3. IT WILL BE IMPORTANT TO SEE HOW THE FEDAYEEN WILL EMERGE FROM THIS. ONE MUST HOPE THAT IF THEY HAVE ENHANCED THEIR POWER, THIS WILL LEAD TO A GREATER SENSE OF RESPONSIBILITY, BUT MUCH WILL DEPEND ON WHETHER THE GENERALLY MORE REALISTIC FATAH OR THE WILD MEN OF THE PFLP AND OTHER EXTREMIST GROUPS COME OUT ON TOP.

FCO PASS PRIORITY TO DEFCOMCEN, MOSCOW, BAGHDAD, WASHINGTON, UKMI S NEW YORK, PARIS, AND JERUSALEM.  
DEFCOMCEN PASS PRIORITY TO MOD DI 4 AND JIS NE.

SIR P ADAMS

/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/

/SENT TO D.C.C./

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CYPHER CAT A

RESTRICTED

IMMEDIATE AMMAN

TO MOD DI4

TELEGRAM NO FOH 131637Z 13 FEBRUARY

12

PA

Agm

16/2

RESTRICTED

ADDRESSED TO DI4 AND TO FCO REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO  
HQ BFNE JIS (NE) DA BEIRUT.

INTERNAL SECURITY SITUATION AMMAN. AS AT 131630Z.

IT HAS BEEN A QUIET DAY AND NO INCIDENTS HAVE BEEN REPORTED  
LAST NIGHT RECCE SHOWED INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES STILL IN  
POSITION AND ALERT AS EVER. FEDAYEEN SEEN ON ROAD CONSTRUCTIONS  
CARRYING ARMS AND DRIVING AROUND FULLY ARMED QUOTE TO SHOW  
THE FLAG UNQUOTE. IT SEEMS THAT ALL IS NOT YET OVER AND TENSION  
REMAINS HIGH.

DEFENCE COMMCEN PASS TO MOD DI4 HQ BFNE AND JIS(NE)

FCO PASS DEF COMMCEN

SIR F ADAMS

[SENT TO D.C.C.].

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CYFHER CAT A

IMMEDIATE AMMAN

TO MOD D14

TELEGRAM NO FOH 141730Z

14 FEBRUARY 1970

RESTRICTED

ADDRESSED TO MOD D14 AND TO FCO REPEATED FOR  
TO HQBFNE JIS(NE) DA BEIRUT

RECEIVED IN REGORRATNO 14 FEB 70 NCS/1
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PA.  
Arson  
ib/h

INTERNAL SECURITY SITUATION IN AMMAN.

RECONNAISSANCE EARLY MORNING 14 FEBRUARY SHOWED ARMED FEDAYEEN  
STILL MANNING SOME ROAD BLOCKS, BUT TRAFFIC MOVING NORMALLY.  
BY 1400 HRS 14 FEBRUARY ONLY A FEW ARMED FEDAYEEN CLEARLY NOT  
ON DUTY COULD BE SEEN ON THE STREETS AND NO ROAD BLOCKS WERE  
MANNED BY THEM. TYRES STONES AND OLD CARS STILL LITTER SOME  
STREETS BUT CAUSE ONLY MINOR TRAFFIC CONGESTION. INTERNAL  
SECURITY FORCES REMAIN DEPLOYED. JOINT FEDAYEEN AND  
JORDANIAN MILITARY POLICE PATROLS HAVE CONTINUED THROUGHOUT  
THE DAY AND INTERNAL SECURITY POLICE HAVE ALSO RESUMED  
PATROLLING.

LIFE IN AMMAN TONIGHT HAS RETURNED TO NORMAL. IT IS THE  
ABSENCE OF ARMED FEDAYEEN THAT IS NOT NORMAL. THE QIADA STILL  
MAINTAINS COMPLETE SILENCE ABOUT THE EVENTS OF THIS WEEK.  
IT APPEARS THAT THE CRISIS IS OVER FOR THE MOMENT - BAR THE  
TALKING WHICH WE THINK MIGHT HAVE TAKEN PLACE WITH FEDAYEEN  
GROUPS BEFORE AN EFFORT WAS MADE TO IMPLEMENT THE REGULATIONS  
I HOPE TO GET THE ARMY'S VERSION OF THE WEEK'S EVENT SOON.  
OFFICIAL QUARTERS STILL SEEM TO KEEP TO THE LINE THAT THIS  
EXERCISE HAS BEEN SCHEDULED TO BE CARRIED OUT FOR SEVERAL  
MONTHS PAST AND THAT IT WAS AN EXERCISE TO MAINTAIN LAW AND  
ORDER. AND NO DIRECT CONFRONTATION WAS ENVISAGED, NOR WAS  
THERE ANY SIGNIFICANCE IN THE TIMING.

DEFENCE COMMCEN PASS TO MOD D14, HQBFNE, JIS(NE)

FCO PASS DEFENCE COMMCEN

SIR P ADAMS

[SENT TO D.C.C.]

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FFFFF



CYPHER CAT A  
IMMEDIATE AMMAN  
TELEGRAM NO 83

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY NO. 10 16 FEB 1970 FEBRUARY
NET 1/1

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ADDRESSED TO FCO TEL NO 83 DATED 15 FEBRUARY REPEATED FOR  
INFORMATION TO PRIORITY BEIRUT, TEL AVIV, CAIRO, BAGHDAD,  
MOSCOW, WASHINGTON, UKNIS NEW YORK, PARIS, MOD DIA, JISNE  
AND SAVING TO JERUSALEM.

MY TEL NO 79: KING HUSSEIN AND THE FEDAYEEN.

THE KING GAVE A PRESS CONFERENCE ON 14 FEBRUARY AT WHICH HE  
GAVE HIS VERSION OF THE WEEK'S EVENTS. THIS HAS BEEN CARRIED  
BY AGENCIES: A TEXT FOLLOWS BY BAG.

2. AHMED TOLUQAN, DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER OF  
DEFENCE, HAS GIVEN ME A RATHER FULLER ACCOUNT. THIS CONFIRMED  
OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT THE KING'S MOVE WAS DESIGNED AS ANOTHER  
(SERIES) OF HIS PERIODICAL ATTEMPTS TO CALL THE FEDAYEEN  
TO ORDER AND TO GET THEM TO OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND. HE WAS  
BECOMING INCREASINGLY DISTURBED BY ACTS OF LAWLESSNESS AND  
DEFIANCE (SUCH AS THE REMOVAL BY FORCE FROM AN ISRID COURTROOM  
OF A MAN STANDING TRIAL) AND BY THE INVOLVEMENT OF LEFT-WING  
GROUPS IN ACTION TO PROVOKE STRIKES IN JORDANIAN FACTORIES.  
TOLUQAN CONFIRMED RUMOURS THAT THE KING HAD TRIED TO PRESS THE  
PRIME MINISTER INTO ACTION SOME WEEKS AGO, BUT THAT TALHOUNI  
HAD BEEN RELUCTANT TO RISK A COLLISION WITH THE FEDAYEEN AND  
HAD SUCCESSFULLY ARGUED FOR POSTPONEMENT DURING HIS TRIP TO  
GERMANY AND THE SUBSEQUENT SUMMIT MEETING IN CAIRO. KING  
HUSSEIN HAD HOWEVER PERSUADED HIM TO ACT IMMEDIATELY ON RETURN  
FROM CAIRO AND BEFORE THE KING WAS DUE TO LEAVE FOR ABU DHABI  
AND PAKISTAN. THE CABINET HAD THUS COME TO APPROVE THE ISSUE  
OF THE REGULATIONS (WHICH HAD BEEN CAREFULLY DRAFTED SO THAT  
THEY WERE COVERED BY EXISTING LEGISLATION) UNDER PRESSURE OF  
TIME, WITHOUT PROPER CONSIDERATION AND, MOST IMPORTANT AS THE  
GOVERNMENT NOW REALISED, WITHOUT PRIOR WARNING TO THE FEDAYEEN  
LEADERS.

/3. THE GOVERNMENT'S



3. THE GOVERNMENT'S CONFIDENCE THAT FEDAYEEN RELUCTANCE TO COMPLY COULD BE DEALT WITH BY A SHOW OF FORCE WAS PROBABLY ENCOURAGED BY AN INCIDENT ON 8-9 FEBRUARY, WHEN THE FDFLP REMOVED A SMALL CAMP THEY HAD SET UP IN AN AREA CLOSE TO JORDAN ARMY POSITIONS ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF AMMAN, WHEN FIRMLY TOLD BY UNITS OF THE NEW 3RD DIVISION (WITH ARMOUR IN SUPPORT) TO DO SO.

4. THUS THE GOVERNMENT SEEM TO HAVE MISJUDGED BOTH THE SHARP REACTION OF THE FEDAYEEN AND THEIR OWN CAPACITY TO DEAL WITH IT. ACCORDING TO TOUQAN THE TWO MAJOR CLASHES HAD BOTH BEEN BROUGHT ABOUT BY STUPID ACTION ON THE PART OF THE SECURITY AUTHORITIES.

5. TOUQAN SAID THE IRAQI'S HAD BEEN HELPFUL. HARDAN TAKRITI HAD TELEPHONED HIM FROM BAGHDAD TO ASK WHAT WAS GOING ON AND HAD BEEN INVITED TO COME TO SEE FOR HIMSELF. WHEN HE DID SO HE SAID HE UNDERSTOOD AND SYMPATHISED WITH THE JORDAN GOVERNMENT'S NEED TO RESTORE LAW AND ORDER AND SAID THE SALAHUDDIN FORCE WOULD HELP IF REQUIRED.

6. THE MINISTER WAS AT PAINS TO REPRESENT THE KING'S DECISION TO 'FREEZE' THE REGULATIONS NOT AS A SURRENDER BUT AS A PROVISION TO ENABLE DISCUSSION ON IMPLEMENTATION BETWEEN BOTH SIDES CONCERNED. HE FREELY ADMITTED THAT THIS PROCESS OUGHT TO HAVE TAKEN PLACE BEFORE PUBLICATION OF THE REGULATIONS BUT CLAIMED THAT TALKS HAD NOW STARTED WELL. IT WAS A RESULT OF THESE THAT FEDAYEEN ROADBLOCKS WERE NO LONGER MANNED AND SOME REMOVED, AND THERE WOULD BE NO MORE DEFIANT DRIVING ROUND THE TOWN BY ARMED GROUPS.

7. OUR OWN OBSERVATIONS CONFIRM A SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENT IN DISCIPLINE AND ORDER ON THE STREETS. BUT IT WOULD BE UNWISE TO ASSUME THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAS GOT OFF SO LIGHTLY FOR ITS CLUMSY AND ILL-TIMED ACTIONS. A SCAPEGOAT(POSSIBLY TALHOUNI) MAY YET HAVE TO BE FOUND. SVAST QUANTITIES OF WEAPONS ARE STILL

/DEPLOYED ON



CONFIDENTIAL

AMMAN TEL. NO. 83 TO F.C.O.

-3-

DEPLOYED ON BOTH SIDES AND A SINGLE FOOLISH ACTION COULD LEAD TO A SERIOUS SHOOT UP. THE KING HAS LOST PERSONAL PRESTIGE EVEN AMONG SOME OF HIS TRADITIONALLY LOYAL SUPPORTERS. AND ANY HOPE WHICH EXISTED THAT THE PRESENT JORDANIAN REGIME WOULD BE ABLE TO CONTROL THE FEDAYEEN AFTER A SETTLEMENT MUST HAVE BEEN SERIOUSLY DIMINISHED AND THE SETTLEMENT MADE THAT MUCH MORE DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE.

DEFENCE COMMCEN PAS PRIORITY TO MOD DIA AND JISNE

FCO PASS DEFENCE COMMCEN BAGHDAD MOSCOW WASHINGTON UKHIS NEW YORK PARIS AND SAVING TO JERUSALEM

SIR P ADAMS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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A. THE ARAB WORLD AND ISRAELJordanian Cabinet's Decision

Amman home service in Arabic 12.05 and 16.00 GMT 10.2.70

Text of announcement:

The Cabinet met this morning under the Premier, Bahjat at-Talhuni. After the two-hour meeting the Culture and Information Minister, Salah Abu Zayd, said that the Cabinet had adopted the following decision:

The serious stage through which the Arab nation is now passing in confronting the escalating Israeli aggression places on the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan a major duty which it is bearing most honourably and valiantly along with the struggling fraternal Arab States in the battle of struggle and liberation. It is proceeding with firm assured steps. This stage, with all the preparation, readiness, organisation and planning it requires, has prompted the Cabinet to issue the following decision addressed to every citizen, to the people as a whole and to every free and genuine Arab living on the soil of this struggling country. The Cabinet asks government departments and authorities to implement it, each according to the duties and responsibilities assigned to it.

The Cabinet believes that the Jordanian armed forces, which are daily setting the greatest examples of bravery and sacrifice, deserve to enjoy a fitting atmosphere in which to reinforce their ability and strength. This will be effected by rallying all forces round the armed forces and by organising the citizens into a single comprehensive edifice behind them in the fateful battle. The Cabinet also believes that the field of struggle cannot be safe and secure unless it is protected by a united and organised society governed by law and order and with general confidence in the State and a special confidence between citizens.

Assuming the duties of government in this difficult time, out of its loyalty to the trust it bears, to protect and implement the provisions of the Constitution, and acting in accordance with the law and in the service of the people to preserve the people's unity and protect the honour of struggle and ensure that it serves its purpose, the Cabinet hereby issues the following decision as an imperative necessity dictated by the circumstances of every people determined to regain their usurped rights and occupied homeland:

(1) All the forces of the State - Government, popular and individual - are requested to play their part according to law and the plans of the responsible authorities. Anyone who fails to serve the homeland and to do his duty as dictated by the general interest and in the best manner he can is punishable by law.

(2) The citizen's freedom is protected by the Constitution as stipulated in Article 7. Interference with, restriction of, or encroachment on this freedom is forbidden except according to the provisions of law and order and by the responsible official and legal authorities empowered by law.

(3) Any form of delay, restriction, or obstruction of the public security authorities or any official from any official establishment when they are doing their duty is absolutely forbidden. Anyone who violates this is punishable in accordance with article 186 of Penal Code 16 of 1960.

(4) Every citizen must carry his identity card at all times and must produce it for the security authorities if asked to do so according to the Personal Identification Card Regulation No. 110 of 1965.



(5) It is forbidden to open fire within the boundaries of towns and villages, and especially within the boundaries of capital and municipalities, either for practice or to celebrate any occasion. Anyone who violates this is punishable according to the military administration instructions.

(6) It is forbidden to carry arms within the boundaries of the capital, to have arms in public vehicles, buses, taxis and service cars, or to carry arms in mosques, public places, cafes, cinemas and crowded places. Only popular resistance organisations are excepted. Anyone who violates this is punishable according to the Fire Arms Law No. 38 of 1954.

(7) Since the storage of explosives and ammunition within the boundaries of the capital and the municipalities and populated places subjects the public to danger, the storage or possession of any amount of explosives is forbidden within the boundaries of the capital and populated places in any circumstances. A period of a fortnight from the date of this decision is given for the removal of stored explosives, or the notification of the Jordanian Army Command to enable the armed forces to dispose of the explosives in proper places or to use them in whatever way may be decided. Anyone who violates this is punishable in accordance with Article 3 of Explosives Law No. 13 of 1953.

(8) Every vehicle operating in the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan must bear the official number assigned to it by the Traffic Department. Any vehicle driver must always carry registration papers in accordance with Articles 105, 106 and 126 of Road Transport Law No. 49 of 1958. A period of a fortnight from the date of this decision is given for implementation, after which every means of transport not registered and not bearing an official number authorised by the responsible authorities will be confiscated and used for popular resistance, and those responsible will be referred to the courts.

(9) All unauthorised demonstrations, gatherings, meetings and conferences are forbidden. Conferences must obtain permission from the Ministry of the Interior and its departments in accordance with Article 8 Public Gatherings Law No. 60 of 1953 and current laws and regulations.

(10) All bulletins, newspapers, magazines and publications issued in violation of the regulations in force are forbidden. Anyone who violates this will be referred to the State security courts and all means at his disposal will be confiscated. He will be punishable in accordance with Publications Law No. 16 of 1955.

(11) Party activities are forbidden by law and their practice in any form is forbidden. Violators will be referred to the courts in accordance with the regulations in force. They will be tried in accordance with Political Parties Law No. 15 of 1955.

(12) Any increase of prices beyond the level fixed by competent official quarters is absolutely forbidden. All merchants, irrespective of their trade, must clearly and prominently mark the prices to every commodity on sale. Violators will be committed to trial by military courts.

#### Palestinian Reaction to Jordanian Cabinet Decision

'Voice of Fatah' in Arabic 18.30 GMT 10.2.70

##### (i) Excerpts from broadcast:

The Jordanian Government has issued decisions aimed wholly at stopping the activity of the Palestine revolution in every sphere... Is this a prelude to a political settlement? Is it a prelude to a terrible massacre in Jordan? Do they want us to face the Zionist aggression without arms as happened during the June aggression?... Has the June lesson not been enough to teach us to arm the masses?



TOP SECRET

(16)

CYPHER CAT A

IMMEDIATE AMMAN

TELEGRAM U/N 84

CONFIDENTIAL

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

16, FEBRUARY 1970

NET 1/

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ADDRESSED TO FCO TELNO U/N 16 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO  
BEIRUT, TEL AVIV, CAIRO, BAGHDAD, MOSCOW, WASHINGTON,  
UKMIS NEW YORK, PARIS, MOD DI4, JIS NE AND SAVING TO  
JERUSALEM.

*amended*

MY TEL NO 83: PARA. 2 PLEASE READ QUOTE TOUQAN UNQUOTE  
FOR QUOTE TONGAN UNQUOTE. PLEASE READ TOUQAN FOR TONGAN  
WHEREVER THE NAME APPEARS.

2. PARA. 2 LINE FOUR PLEASE DELETE QUOTE (SERIES)  
UNQUOTE.

DEFENCE COMMCEN PASS PRIORITY TO MOD DI4 AND JIS NE.  
FCO PASS DEFENCE COMMCEN, BAGHDAD, MOSCOW, WASHINGTON,  
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SIR P ADAMS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

[SENT TO D.C.C.]

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*Adams*  
*152*



CYPHER CATEGORY A  
PRIORITY AMMAN  
TELNO FCH 171400Z FEB

RESTRICTED  
TO MOD D14

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ADDRESSED TO MOD D14 TELNO FCH 171400Z FEB RFI FCO, HQBFNE,  
JIS(NE) AND DA BEIRUT.

FROM DA AMMAN

RECEIVED IN: 14 FEB 1973 NE J1/1
--

INTERNAL SECURITY SITUATION IN AMMAN AS AT 171200Z FEB.

BY MORNING 16 FEB MANY OF THE TYRES, STONES AND OLD CARS  
PREVIOUSLY OBSTRUCTING STREETS IN JEBELS TAJ, ASHRAFIYA AND  
HUSSEIN HAD BEEN REMOVED. SOME OF THE FEDAYEEN CAN STILL BE  
SEEN MOVING ROUND IN VEHICLES WITH ARMS BUT ARE CLEARLY RELAXING  
THUS THE DAILY SCENE IS MUCH LIKE THAT TO WHICH WE ARE ACCUSTOMED.

ARMY INTERNAL SECURITY FORCES HAVE THINNED OUT AT ROAD CHECK-  
POINTS AROUND AMMAN AND TRAFFIC MOVES FREELY DURING THE EID HOLIDAY.

DEFENCE COMMCEN PASS PRIORITY TO D14, HQBFNE, JIS(NE).  
FCO PASS PRIORITY TO DEFENCE COMMCEN.  
SIR P. ADAMS

[SENT TO D.C.C.]

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AMMAN

telegram No. *upw* of *16/2/70* to FCO

FCO telegram No. \_\_\_\_\_

of \_\_\_\_\_

to \_\_\_\_\_

*Amend to read.*

*Amman No 84 of 16/2/70 to FCO*

Authorised by *[Signature]*

*K129.*

Staff Officer Room 131

Date

*19. 2. 70*

[Delete where not applicable]

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SYMPHER/CAT A AND BY BAG

PRIORITY FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 48

TO AMMAN  
16 FEBRUARY 1970.

(N.E.D.)

CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO AMMAN TELNO 48 OF 16/2 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO  
BEIRUT TEL AVIV CAIRO BAGHDAD MOSCOW WASHINGTON UKHIS NEW YORK  
AND JISNE SAVING TO JERUSALEM

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 83: KING HUSSEIN AND THE FEDAYEEN.

THANK YOU FOR THIS ACCOUNT. YOUR OBSERVATIONS (PARAGRAPH 7) TEND  
TO SHOW THAT THE KING'S CONFIDENCE IN HIS BEING ABLE TO WIN OVER  
OR CONTAIN THE FEDAYEEN IF A SETTLEMENT IS REACHED HAS BEEN  
EXAGGERATED IN THE PAST.

2. WE HAVE ALSO TENDED TO ACCEPT THAT THE KING WOULD GET THE  
UPPER HAND IN ANY EARLIER SHOWDOWN PROVIDED IT WAS PROVOKED BY  
THE FEDAYEEN. THIS ASSESSMENT NOW SEEMS OUT OF DATE, NOT LEAST  
BECAUSE OF THE STRONG POSITION THE FEDAYEEN HAVE BUILT UP IN  
AMMAN ITSELF. NEVERTHELESS WE ACCEPT THAT ON THE MOST RECENT  
OCCASION THE "PROVOCATION" COULD BE REPRESENTED TO HAVE COME  
FROM THE GOVERNMENT SIDE. IT WOULD BE INTERESTING TO KNOW WHO WERE  
THE KING'S ADVISERS WHO "PERSUADED HIM TO ACT IMMEDIATELY ON  
RETURN FROM CAIRO" (PARAGRAPH 2 OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE).  
AND THE REASONING BEHIND THEIR ADVICE.

3. WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL FOR AN UP TO DATE ASSESSMENT OF THE  
REGIME'S CHANCES OF WEATHERING INCREASING FEDAYEEN PRESSURES  
WITH THE PROGRESSIVE DEROGATION FROM THE KING'S AUTHORITY WHICH  
THESE PERIODICAL FEDAYEEN/GOVERNMENT CONFRONTATIONS SEEM TO ENTAIL.  
STEWART

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Hassan  
18/2

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Registry No. <sup>N</sup>E  
DEPARTMENT

• Date and time (G.M.T.) telegram should  
reach addressee(s).....

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~~Secret~~  
~~Confidential~~  
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(Date).....

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~~Code~~  
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—if any]

[Codeword—if any].....

Addressed to *Amman* ~~AMMAN~~ (~~Immediate~~)

telegram No. *48* (date) *16 Feb.*

And to .....

*repeated for information to* (~~Priority~~) *BEIRUT, TEL AVIV,*

*CAIRO, BAGHDAD, MOSCOW, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK,*  
*JISNE,*

*Saving to* JERUSALEM

Draft Telegram to:—

Amman

No. *48*

(Date) *16/2*

And to:—

Repeat to:—

~~Beirut, Tel Aviv,~~  
~~Cairo, Baghdad,~~  
~~Moscow,~~  
~~Washington,~~  
~~UKMIS New York,~~  
~~JISNE,~~

*Saving to:* ✓  
Jerusalem  
*CA*

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MOD Int.

Copies to:—

Your telegram No. 83: King Hussein and  
the fedayeen.

Thank you for this account. Your observations  
(paragraph 7) tend to show that the King's  
confidence in his being able to win over or  
contain the fedayeen if a settlement is reached  
has been exaggerated in the past.

2. We have also tended to accept that the  
King would get the upper hand in any <sup>earlier</sup> showdown

provided it was provoked by the fedayeen. This  
~~not less because of the strong position the fedayeen have built up in~~  
assessment now seems out of date, ~~although we~~ *German*  
~~nevertheless we~~ *usself*

accept that on the most recent occasion the

"provocation" could be represented to have come  
from the Government side. It would be interesting  
to know who were the King's advisers who

"persuaded him to act immediately on return from  
Cairo" (paragraph 2 of your telegram under reference).

*and the reasoning behind their advice.* 1/3.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

*16/2*

*15 16 17*



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3. We should be grateful for an up to date assessment of the regime's chances of weathering increasing fedayeen pressures ~~together~~ with the progressive derogation from the King's authority which these periodical fedayeen/Government confrontations seem to entail.

162.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN



CYPHER CAT A

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PRIORITY AMMAN

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO 87

18 FEBRUARY 1970

19  
107 107

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ADDRESSED TO FCO TELNO 87 OF 18 FEBRUARY REPEATED FOR  
INFORMATION ROUTINE TO TEL AVIV, CAIRO, BAGHDAD, MOSCOW,  
BEIRUT, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK AND JIS NE.  
SAVING TO JERUSALEM.

NEJ 1/14

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 48: KING HUSSEIN AND THE FEDAYEEN.

THE DUST HAS NOT YET SETTLED BUT I HOPE TO LET YOU  
HAVE A FULLER ASSESSMENT WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS AND  
TO CONSIDER TO WHAT EXTENT THE VIEWS EXPRESSED IN MY  
DESPATCH OF 5 FEBRUARY MAY NEED TO BE REVISED.

2. MEANWHILE WE HAVE MORE EVIDENCE THAT THE KING WAS  
NOT INTENDING AND STILL DOES NOT CONTEMPLATE A MAJOR  
SHOWDOWN OF THE ORDER WHICH MIGHT BE REQUIRED BEFORE  
HE COULD ACCEPT A PACKAGE SETTLEMENT. MEETINGS ON  
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NEW REGULATIONS ARE TO BE RESUMED  
ON 18 FEBRUARY AND THE KING IS UNDERSTOOD TO HAVE MADE  
IT CLEAR TO THE FEDAYEEN LEADERS THAT HE EXPECTS THEIR  
COOPERATION. THE ARMY AND THE FEDAYEEN REMAIN ON THE  
ALERT BUT IT SEEMS TO BE THE KING'S INTENTION TO GET  
BACK TO THE POSITION WHERE HE CAN PLACE SQUARELY ON THE  
FEDAYEEN RESPONSIBILITY FOR ANY FURTHER ARMED CONFRONTATION.

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-2-

3. WITH REFERENCE TO PARAGRAPH 2 OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE I UNDERSTAND THAT IT WAS THE KING WHO PERSUADED THE PRIME MINISTER TO ACT IMMEDIATELY ON RETURN FROM CAIRO. THE KING'S OWN ADVISERS ARE MAINLY HIS FAMILY AND THE SMALL PALACE CLIQUE LED BY ZAID RIFAI., BUT MORE AND MORE HE IS TENDING TO BE HIS OWN ADVISER.

FCO PASS DEFENCE COMMCEN, BAGHDAD, MOSCOW, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK AND SAVING TO JERUSALEM.

DEFENCE COMMCEN PASS JIS NE.

SIR P. ADAMS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

[SENT TO D.C.C.]

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NEWS D.  
M.O.D.(INT.)

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CYFHER CAT A

S E C R E T

ROUTINE A/AM TO MINISTRY OF DEFENCE D/4

TELEGRAM NO FOR 190930Z

19 FEBRUARY

TOP COPY

SECRET

NEJ  
1/1

ADDRESSED TO MOD D/4 TELEGRAM NO FOR 190930Z FEB REPEATED  
FOR INFORMATION TO JIS(NE) AND FCO  
FROM AA AMMAN

421 BR FLA. ON 18 FEB I CARRIED OUT AN UNOFFICIAL ROAD  
RECCO DURING WHICH I WAS ABLE TO CONFIRM THE EXACT LOCATION  
OF THISEYN AT BR 4182.

2. YOU MAY BE INTERESTED TO KNOW THIS IN CONNECTION WITH  
REPORTS OF KING HUSSEIN'S CONTINGENCY PLANNING  
TO MEET POSSIBLE INTERVENTION BY THIS STM IN THE INTERNAL SECURITY  
SITUATION.

DEFENCE COMMCEN PASS ROUTINE TO D/4 AND JIS(NE)

FCO PASS ROUTINE TO DEFENCE COMMCEN

SIR P ADAMS

[SENT TO D.C.C.]

FILES:

N.EASTERN D.  
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S E C R E T

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
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3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958



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(Inter) 21  
Mr Gray 200

(1/7)



BRITISH EMBASSY,  
CAIRO

P.a. 4 no obs.

PAH mhl

254

18 February, 1970

Dear Tom,

U.A.R. Press attitude  
to the crisis in Jordan

The eruption of last week's crisis in Jordan between King Husain and the commandos was largely overshadowed in the Egyptian press by the Abu Zaabal raid (see my separate letter). There was, however, wide coverage given to the crisis on 12 February, and there was considerable stress on the timing of the measures (1) so soon after the end of the Front-Line States Conference, at which the question was said not to have been discussed, and (2) while Arafat was away in Moscow, leading the Palestine Liberation Organisation delegation.

2. An Ahram editorial on the same day steered a cautious middle course between support for the Liberation Organisations, which, it said, possess a prior right to react against Israel for usurping Arab territory, on the one hand, and for the sovereignty of the Jordanian Government and its right to take such measures, on the other. Nonetheless, the article continued, given their timing, the measures arouse doubts "about someone" and cause anxiety at a time when the allies are "participating in a single struggle against the enemy".

3. The paper underlined the potential danger of such a confrontation, but was understandably careful to avoid taking sides. My impression is that general press sympathies were with the Liberation Organisations, although the relief with which the compromise agreement was greeted indicates that the value to the U.A.R. of King Husain's continued presence, and the implications for the future of the Arab world if he is unable to maintain control over the Resistance Organisations in Jordan, is clearly appreciated here.

4. I am sending a copy of this letter to the Chanceries in Amman and Washington.

Yours  
Cw.

(P.R.H. Wright)

J.W.D. Gray Esq.,  
North African Department,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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IPHER CAT A  
IMMEDIATE AMMAN  
TELEGRAM NO 89

CONFIDENTIAL  
TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
20 FEBRUARY 1970

Pa RMM

231~

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 88 DATED 26/2 REPEATED FOR INFO  
TO PRIORITY TEL AVIV, CAIRO, BEIRUT, WASHINGTON, AND UK  
NEW YORK: ROUTINE LAGHDAO, MOSCOW, JISLE AND SAVING TO JERUSALEM

19  
JAN 27 1970  
NEJ 1/1

BY TELEGRAM NO 87: KING HUSSEIN AND THE FEDAYEEN.

THE TALKS BETWEEN REPRESENTATIVES OF THE GOVERNMENT  
AND THE FEDAYEEN, PRESCRIBED IN THE AGREEMENT TO FREEZE THE  
NEW SECURITY MEASURES, ARE NOW IN PROGRESS. AT PRESENT THEY  
APPEAR TO BE BEING CONDUCTED AT A LOW LEVEL AND IN A FAIRLY  
IMPROVISED KEY. HIGHER LEVEL TALKS ARE EXPECTED IN A DAY OR TWO.

2. WHILE TENSION HAS BY NO MEANS YET DISAPPEARED THERE  
HAVE BEEN ENCOURAGING SIGNS OF FENCE MENDING, SUCH AS FATAH  
BROADCAST URGING RESPECT FOR LAW AND ORDER, AND A JOINT TOUR  
BY FEDAYEEN COMMANDERS AND THE COMMANDER OF THE BEDOUIN FORCES  
TO THE WOUNDED OF BOTH SIDES.

3. PERHAPS MOST SURPRISING OF ALL, THERE IS REMARKABLY  
LITTLE DISPOSITION EVEN AMONG PALESTINIANS TO LAY THE ODIUM  
FOR WHAT HAS HAPPENED AT THE KING'S DOOR, THOUGH HIS QUOTE  
LOUSY ADVISERS UNQUOTE ARE UNIVERSALLY DECRIED.

4. AS YOU KNOW, OUR ASSESSMENT DURING THE PAST YEAR HAS  
BEEN THAT NEITHER SIDE WOULD DELIBERATELY PROVOKE AN ALL  
OUT CONFRONTATION UNLESS OR UNTIL A SITUATION WERE REACHED  
WHERE THE KING WANTED TO MAKE A SETTLEMENT WHICH MIGHT BE  
UNACCEPTABLE TO THE FEDAYEEN LEADERSHIP.

5. ON ANY OBJECTIVE CALCULATION NEITHER SIDE CAN BE  
SURE OF WINNING, THOUGH THERE IS OF COURSE ALWAYS THE  
POSSIBILITY THAT THROUGH EUPHORIA OR BAD INTELLIGENCE  
EITHER SIDE MIGHT MISCALCULATE. BUT EVEN IF HE DID WIN



OTHER THAN IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF A SETTLEMENT, THE KING WOULD HAVE LITTLE TO SHOW FOR HIS VICTORY: THE WEST BANK WOULD STILL BE IN ISRAELI HANDS., THREE-QUARTERS OF THE POPULATION OF AMMAN WOULD STILL BE PALESTINIAN AND MORE BITTERLY HOSTILE THAN EVER., AND HE WOULD HAVE INCURRED THE ODIUM OF MOST OF THE ARAB WORLD.

6. FOR THE FEDAYEEN, VICTORY WOULD MEAN IN PRACTICE THAT THEY WOULD HAVE TO FORM THE GOVERNMENT OF JORDAN IN THE FACE OF HOSTILITY FROM A MAJORITY OF EAST BANKERS AND OF THE ARMY, AND TO COPE WITH ALL THE RESPONSIBILITIES AND DIVERSE POLITICAL ELEMENTS THAT THIS WOULD ENTAIL, TO SAY NOTHING OF THE GREATLY WEAKENED MILITARY POSITION JORDAN WOULD BE IN AND THE GREATER CONSEQUENT RISK OF ISRAELI INTERVENTION. MOREOVER, ALTHOUGH SOME OF THE SMALLER LEFT WING GROUPS MIGHT CONTEMPLATE THIS WITH EQUANIMITY, IT WOULD BE QUITE CONTRARY TO THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF FATAH, THE MOST POWERFUL GROUP.

7. DANGEROUS, THEREFORE, THOUGH THE RECENT CLASHES IN AMMAN HAVE BEEN, I DO NOT BELIEVE THESE BASIC ISSUES HAVE BEEN ALTERED. THE FEDAYEEN HAVE PERHAPS SHOWN THEMSELVES MORE UNITED, MORE DETERMINED AND BETTER ARMED THAN THE KING MAY HAVE SUPPOSED. TOO MUCH SHOULD NOT BE MADE OF THE QUOTE CONTROL UNQUOTE OF AMMAN (YOUR TELEGRAM NO 48).

ALTHOUGH THEIR POSITION IN THE SLUM CAMPS WAS NOT CHALLENGED THEIR OCCUPATION OF OTHER AREAS CAME ABOUT MAINLY BECAUSE SECURITY FORCES WERE WITHDRAWN TO AVOID BLOODSHED. AS FOR THE ARMY OR RATHER THOSE FORMATIONS OF IT EARMARKED FOR INTERNAL SECURITY, THEY HAVE SHOWN THEMSELVES MORE LOYAL AND MORE READY TO OPEN FIRE ON THEIR PALESTINIAN BROTHERS THAN THE FEDAYEEN PERHAPS BELIEVED. IF THESE SALUTARY LESSONS HAVE BEEN LEARNED, THEN WE MIGHT EXPECT TO SEE A CONTINUATION OF THE (UNDERLINE NEXT TWO WORDS) MODUS VIVENDI MUCH AS BEFORE, WITH BOTH SIDES SHOWING LESS INCLINATION TO VENTURE ON BRINKMANSHIP TACTICS.

8. UNFORTUNATELY, HUMAN NATURE BEING WHAT IT IS, HARD LINERS ON BOTH SIDES WILL DOUBTLESS PERSUADE THEMSELVES THAT VICTORY COULD HAVE BEEN THEIRS: THE FEDAYEEN THAT THE KING

LACKED DOWN BECAUSE HE KNEW HE COULD NOT WIN, AND THE ARMY THAT IT WAS ONLY THE KING'S COMMAND THAT PREVENTED THEM FROM GOING IN AND SORTING OUT THE FEDAYEEN ONCE AND FOR ALL. THE MORE SENSIBLE ELEMENTS REALISE HOW MUCH DAMAGE WOULD HAVE BEEN DONE BY A CLASH, TO THE VICTORS AS WELL AS TO THE VANQUISHED, AND THERE CAN BE LITTLE DOUBT THAT THE VAST MAJORITY OF JORDANIANS HEAVED A SIGH OF RELIEF WHEN THE FIRING CEASED. THEY MAY WELL SEE IN THE KING THE ONLY PERSON WHO CAN HOLD THE RING AND PREVENT JORDAN FROM BEING SUBMERGED INTO THE CHAOS OF A CIVIL WAR.

9. ON THE OTHER HAND, WHILE THE KING MAY BE ABLE TO MAINTAIN CONTROL INTERNALLY, I FEAR WE MUST EXPECT A SERIOUS WEAKENING IN HIS ABILITY TO RESTRAIN FEDAYEEN ATTACKS INTO ISRAEL, WITH PREDICTABLE CONSEQUENCES.

10. IN MY DESPATCH OF 13 JUNE 1969 I VENTURED THE CONCLUSION THAT KING HUSSEIN'S CHANCES OF CONTROLLING THE FEDAYEEN IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A SETTLEMENT HAD IMPROVED SLIGHTLY, BUT THAT TIME WAS NOT ON HIS SIDE. THIS HAS MANIFESTLY BEEN THE CASE. IN MY DESPATCH OF 5 FEBRUARY I CONCLUDED THAT HE MIGHT STILL SUCCEED PROVIDED THAT THE SETTLEMENT TERMS WERE EFFICIENTLY QUOTE HONOURABLE UNQUOTE TO COMMAND THE SUPPORT OF THE MAJORITY OF INFLUENTIAL PALESTINIANS. ON BALANCE I THINK THIS STILL HOLDS GOOD, BUT ONLY JUST.

FCO PASS PRIORLY WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK. ROUTINE BAGHDAD, MOSCOW AND DEFCOMCEN SAVING TO JERUSALEM.

DEFCOMCEN PASS ROUTINE JIS NE.

SIR P ADAMS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

[SENT TO D.C.C.]

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RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 10 20 FEB 1970 NEJ 1/1
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CYPHER CAT A

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PRIORITY AMMAN TO M.O.D. DI 4

TELEGRAM NO. FOH 210955Z FEB.

21 FEBRUARY, 1970

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ADDRESSED TO MOD DI4 TELEGRAM NO FOH 210955Z FEBRUARY  
AND TO JIS (NE) REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO FCO.

RJAF HUNTER FORCE.

CER FUJAI TOLD ME THIS MORNING THAT THE HUNTER FORCE  
RETURNED FROM SYRIA TO HAFRAQ ON 20 FEBRUARY 1970.  
THIS IS CONTRARY TO HIS PREVIOUS PREDICTIONS AND WE  
WONDER WHETHER RECENT INTERNAL SECURITY PROBLEMS OR  
CHANGES IN THE POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE WITH SYRIA HAVE  
PRECIPITATED THE FORCE'S RETURN.

DEFCONCEN PASS PRIORITY TO MOD DI4 AND JIS (NE)

FCO PASS PRIORITY TO DEFCONCEN

SIR P ADAMS

[SENT TO D.C.C.]

FILES  
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*Pu PNM*  
24/2.

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
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LYPHER CAT A  
PRIORITY AMMAN  
TELEGRAM NO 92

CONFIDENTIAL  
TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
23 FEBRUARY

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 92 DATED 23 FEBRUARY REFERRED TO  
FOR INFORMATION TO TEL AVIV CAIRO BEIRUT WASHINGTON UKHIS  
NEW YORK BAGHDAD MOSCOW MOD D14 AND JIS N.E.



MY TELEGRAM NO 89. <sup>(22)</sup> KING HUSSEIN AND THE FEDAYEEN.

REPRESENTATIVES OF BOTH SIDES WERE IN SESSION MOST OF YESTERDAY.  
WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE TWO DEPUTY PRIME MINISTERS LED FOR THE  
GOVERNMENT AND YASSER ARAFAT FOR THE 'UNIFIED COMMAND'.

BY ALL ACCOUNTS BOTH SIDES ARE EXPRESSING COMPLETE SATISFACTION  
WITH THE OUTCOME, THOUGH THE AGREED COMMUNIQUE, ISSUED THIS  
MORNING WAS, FOR REASONS OF FACE, DELIBERATELY VAGUE AND REFERRED  
ONLY TO 'AGREEMENT OF VIEW POINTS'.

2. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE AGREEMENT PROVIDES FOR IMPLEMENTATION  
OF MOST ELEMENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT DECREE, AS INDEED WAS FORE-  
SHADOWED BY THE 'ORDER OF THE DAY' PUT OUT BY THE UNIFIED  
COMMAND AFTER ITS MEETING ON 17 FEBRUARY (TEXT BY BAG).  
RESPONSIBILITY FOR ENFORCING THE REGULATIONS IS, WE UNDERSTAND,  
TO BE DIVIDED: THE GOVERNMENT WILL DEAL WITH THE CIVIL OFFENCES  
COMMITTED BY FEDAYEEN, AND THE UNIFIED COMMAND WITH MILITARY  
OFFENCES. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN HOW THIS VERY ARAB ARRANGEMENT  
WILL WORK OUT IN PRACTICE.

3. THERE IS ALMOST UNIVERSAL EXPECTATION THAT THE CABINET  
WILL BE PURGED AND SOME 'NEWER AND CLEANER' MINISTERS APPOINTED,  
THOUGH NO-ONE SEEMS TO HAVE ANY CLEAR IDEA AS TO WHERE SUCH  
ARE TO BE FOUND.

/4. YASSER .

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*Pa JMM*  
*246*



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-2-

4. YASSER ARAFET IS TO HOLD A PRESS CONFERENCE TOMORROW.

DEFENCE COMMEN PASS MOD DIA, JIS P.E.

FCC PASS DEFENCE COMMEN WASHINGTON UKRIS NEW YORK BAGHDAD AND MOSCOW

SIR F ADAMS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED] [SENT TO D.C.C.]

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CYPHER CAT A

PRIORITY AMMAN

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO 94

24 FEBRUARY 1970

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ADDRESSED TO FCO TEL NO 94 OF 24 FEBRUARY REPEATED FOR  
INFORMATION (ROUTINE) TO TEL AVIV, CAIRO, BEIRUT, WASHINGTON,  
UKHIS NEW YORK, BAGHDAD, MOSCOW, MOD.DIA AND JIS (NE).

SAVING TO JERUSALEM.

MY TELEGRAM NO. 92: KING HUSSEIN AND THE FEDAYEEN.

I HAD THE OPPORTUNITY ON 23 FEBRUARY FOR A SHORT TALK  
ON THE CURRENT SITUATION WITH KING HUSSEIN.

2. THE KING WAS SURPRISINGLY RELAXED AND ROBUST. HE BLAMED  
HIMSELF FOR HIS FAILURE IN THE PAST TO ESTABLISH ADEQUATE  
CONTACTS WITH FEDAYEEN LEADERS BUT EXPRESSED HIMSELF VERY  
SATISFIED WITH THE ARRANGEMENTS NOW MADE WITH THEM. HE  
CONFIRMED THAT HE REGARDED THE UNDERTAKINGS GIVEN BY THE  
FEDAYEEN LEADERS TO DISCIPLINE THEIR MEMBERS AS AN  
ACCEPTABLE MEASURE OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE LAW. HE ADDED THAT  
THE FEDAYEEN LEADERS HAD ACCEPTED RESPONSIBILITY FOR  
DISCIPLINE TO HIM PERSONALLY AND SAID THAT MACHINERY DESIGNED  
TO PROVIDE FOR THIS WAS NOW BEING SET UP. THE KING SAID  
THAT THE COUNTRY WAS MORE UNITED THAN EVER BEFORE AND HE HAD  
SERIOUS HOPES OF BEING ABLE TO EXERT A MODERATING INFLUENCE  
ON THE MORE EXTREME FEDAYEEN GROUPS.

3. KING HUSSEIN SAID THAT HIS MOST SERIOUS WORRY DURING THE  
CRISIS HAD BEEN WHETHER HE COULD PERSUADE THE ARMY TO HOLD  
THEIR BRAKES ON. AFTER AN INITIAL AND BRIEF PERIOD OF DOUBT  
HE HAD SATISFIED HIMSELF THAT THE MORALE OF ALL UNITS WAS HIGH.,  
COMMANDING OFFICERS HAD BEEN BEGGING TO BE ALLOWED QUOTE TO SORT  
THE FEDAYEEN OUT ONCE AND FOR ALL UNQUOTE. BUT IT HAD BEEN /CLEAR TO

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- 2 -

CLEAR TO HIM THAT THIS COULD NOT BE DONE WITHOUT BLOODSHED ON AN UNACCEPTABLE SCALE AND MOREOVER THIS WAS NOT THE RIGHT TIME (BY WHICH I GATHERED THAT HE MEANT THAT IT WOULD BE PREMATURE TO HAVE A REAL SHOWDOWN WHILE THE CHANCES OF A SETTLEMENT WITH ISRAEL WERE SO REMOTE).

4. IT IS GENERALLY SUPPOSED HERE THAT THERE WILL BE SOME CHANGES IN THE GOVERNMENT AND POSSIBLY THE ARMY COMMAND. THE MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR HAS ALREADY RESIGNED. UNTIL THESE CHANGES HAVE BEEN MADE AND A LITTLE EXPERIENCE OF THE WORKINGS OF THE NEW ARRANGEMENTS HAS BEEN GAINED IT WILL BE DIFFICULT TO SEE TO WHAT EXTENT THE KING HAS SUCCEEDED REASSERTING HIS AUTHORITY. THE GOVERNMENT AS A WHOLE AND THOSE CLOSE TO THE KING IN PARTICULAR HAVE INCURRED CONSIDERABLY MORE ODIUM THAN HE HAS PERSONALLY AND IT WILL PROBABLY BE TIMELY FOR HIM TO DO SOME PRUNING. MEANWHILE I THINK IT CAN BE SAID THAT RESPECT FOR LAW AND ORDER HAS BEEN RESTORED., AT LEAST TEMPORARILY.

FCO PASS ROUTINE TO DEFCOMCEN, WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, BAGHDAD , MOSCOW AND SAVING TO JERUSALEM.

DEFCOMCEN PASS ROUTINE TO MOD DIA AND JIS NE.

SIR P. ADAMS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]  
[SENT TO D.C.C.]

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26

Reg. Copy to  
1) Cabinet Office Accounts Staff. (Mr. Simmonds)  
2) MOD (D.I. 4.)  
3) P.S.D.  
Dun. Ender

BRITISH EMBASSY,  
TEL AVIV.

RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY No. 10  
26 FEB 1970  
NEJ 1/1

17 February, 1970  
on M. G. 15/2  
has been...  
A very useful letter.  
(to be corrected - 11260 117) 95

Dear Peter,

The Israel Government have shown, not unreasonably, a good deal of interest in the latest bout between the King of Jordan and the fedayeen.


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2. On February 11th, when the King's measures were first known here, Comay told me that although the fedayeen radios were in full cry against the measures, the Israeli monitoring service had noticed that the Arab Government radios were for their part saying nothing. He wondered whether during the Cairo summit meeting the King might have received some indication from President Nasser and other Arab leaders that they would give him a chance if he decided to act against the fedayeen.

3. When I saw Lourie on other matters on February 13th he also asked what we knew about the latest developments in Jordan. He said that the Israelis' own information, which he claimed was reliable, was that the King had been given the green light by President Nasser to explore one American proposal for a Middle East settlement and that this might have emboldened him to act against the fedayeen. I said that I had no information about the origins of all this, but that if the King was going to embark on the delicate and possibly unpopular business of probing the American proposals it seemed prima facie unlikely that he would saddle himself with the unpopularity of tackling the fedayeen at the same time. Since

J.P. Tripp, Esq.





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- 2 -

then, of course, I have seen telegrams from Amman and Washington from which it appears, at any rate according to the Americans, that so far from giving the King a green light to probe the American proposals, President Nasser seems to have warned him off and pretty sharply.

4. At a briefing for foreign military attachés on February 12th, which the Military Attaché attended, the IDF spokesman said that the King wanted a showdown with the fedayeen in order to establish in Amman the same degree of control over their activities as the Egyptian and Syrian Governments enjoyed in Cairo and Damascus. The spokesman also claimed that of late, and particularly since the Israeli attack on Irbid, the shelling of settlements in the Jordan Valley had virtually ceased and there was comparative peace along the eastern front. This accords generally with our own observation. It is also interesting that, although we were told that the Israelis suspected that the latest successful attack on two ships at Eilat had been mounted from Jordan, they have taken no reprisals.

5. It is hard to know whether there is any pattern in all this. In the light of Amman telegram No. 83 it now seems that King Hussein's operation against the fedayeen had been planned before the Cairo meeting, and does not seem to have taken its origin there.

6. Another possibility which has crossed my mind, although there is no positive evidence for it, is that there may have been some understanding between the King and the Israelis. If, for example, the King had told them of his plans and they had agreed to give him the best chance they could to carry them out, it would be natural for them both to acquiesce in a de facto truce on the eastern front and when the

- 2 -

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
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- 3 -

operation started to express optimism about it. It would also be natural for them to ascribe its origin to some understanding with the other Arabs rather than with themselves. It would also be similar to the way in which they have given indirect assurances to the Lebanese Government intended to assist them in their struggle with the fedayeen there.

7. The Israelis are of course often inclined to over-estimate the chances of the King being an effective negotiating partner if he was liberated from the Four Powers or from entanglements with other Arab leaders. But they also go through periods of disenchantment with him. Now that the latest operation against the fedayeen seems to have failed another such period may begin. It is incidentally reported this morning that the Allenby Bridge was shelled from the Jordanian side yesterday.


8. I am sending copies of this letter to Dick Bennett, Philip Adams and Cecil King.

  
(E.D.W. Barnes)

- 3 -

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CONFIDENTIAL

Foreign and Commonwealth Office  
London S.W.1

27

(NEJ 1/1)

25 February, 1970.

Pr  
am  
3/3

Thank you very much for your most useful letter of 17 February about the Israeli attitude to the recent confrontation with the fedaycen in Amman. The Israeli Embassy here also took a keen interest in our assessment of the events in Amman at that time.

2. The possibility you mention in your paragraph 6 is an intriguing one. I am sure that the King was glad of a lull on the "western front". But we have seen no evidence that he had an effective channel of communication to secure their acquiescence in a truce.

3. I am sending a copy of this letter to Philip Adams.

(J.P. Tripp)

H.E. Mr. E.J.W. Barnes, MBE,  
TEL AVIV

CONFIDENTIAL

# JORDAN NEWS AGENCY

(28)

Amman - Jordan

Bulletin No. 1113

Saturday-Feb. 14, 1970

1-

Amman, Feb. 14 (JNA)-

H.M. King Hussein held a press conference at noon today,

the conference was attended by H.R.H. Crown Prince Hassan, H.E.

Premier Bahjat Talhouni, the deputy Premier and minister of

Foreign Affairs Mr. Abdul Moneim Rifai, Chief of the Royal Court

and the Minister of Culture and Information.

The press conference was attended by more than eighty and journalists /press reporters representing Arab and world Broadcasting and T.V. stations and the press.

H.M. the King began his press conference with explaining recent developments saying:

I am very pleased to seize this opportunity to welcome this great number of representatives of the press and news agencies, and of Arab and foreign broadcasting and television stations.

I would first like to speak about latest developments in this country, and then I shall answer your questions with the frankness I accustomed you to whenever we met.

Handwritten notes and signatures: "Mr. Hand...", "Mr. Y...", "Mr. M...", "28th", "A King on a hot tin roof...", "King Hussein 'climbing down' press conference on 14 Feb. It contains several bits of interest. Addendum 25/2".

Handwritten signature: "R. The Sultan".



Events have been depicted in a distorted way and contrary to facts. I would like to emphasize that all Jordanian in this country and all other Arabs on its soil fight the battle of the whole Arab nation and its destiny.

This country stands as a shield in the face of aggression, it is resolved and determined to resist occupation and aggression, all people in this country practise their lawful right in resisting aggression and occupation, all stand in the face of enemy expansionist designs in our country and in the greater Arab homeland.

It is our duty in the Arab world to act sincerely, loyally and consciously. We should organize ourselves, mobilize our resources, and pool all our efforts to continue performing our duties and continue forming a shield in the face of aggression.

I know much about the facts of the situation in the Arab World, I have always aimed at developing this country and at mobilizing efforts in a coordinated and organized way in all fields so that every one should do his duty towards the battle as best as could be and in the best possible manner.

We aim at blocking all efforts to disrupt national unity and to distort the true picture of this country as drawn in the heart of every Arab in our Greater Homeland.

In regards to recent developments in the situation, the government took from its part a step bringing back to the mind certain rules and regulations in this country, and this is its responsibility as a responsible government, but may be there was no chance to explain these measures taken, the reason for that, may have been that the authorities were not expecting that these regulations and rules will be explained in a different way from their actual meaning .

The government on one hand did not bring up anything new, and it cannot leave aside its responsibilities and duties. The government cannot annul the rules and regulations of this country.

The government was aiming at organizing the state and at preserving law and order so that everyone here can live under normal conditions and in an atmosphere sound in all directions.

We feel sorry for what has happened as a result of misunderstanding and thus we decided to freeze the measures, the reason why we did that is what we have felt of the sincere feelings of all those concerned who in turn came up to the level of responsibility and their consideration of public interests, and so things started to go back to normal, and at the same time talks and exchange of ideas between all parties will be started soon to regain the situation fully in control as I have said so that all energies will be mobilized for the sake of the battle and for the sake of defending our existence and the being of our nation and to defend its destiny and future.



This country and this people, whose armed forces stand at the top is the country and people of resistance and they are all determined to live with honour or die for the sake of our joint ends here and our aims all over the Arab world. This is a state of resistance and its people are those who are determined to resist and struggle occupation and aggression, resistance grow because the people here are determined to fight and because we wanted it to grow.

No one intended to cause resistance any harm, for we and resistance are integral, and the picture is that of a people determined to live and face the challenge.

Things in this country are returning to normal, and we sincerely hope that sound bases will be laid down to avoid any split of ranks in the future, thus we mobilize all efforts for the battle in which all will do their duty,.We shall try hard to regain our full rights, or we shall perish on our path to our ends. Our rights include every inch of our occupied lands and our dear Jerusalem as well as rescuing our brothers in the occupied areas. Everything good for the battle will remain, and anything that might hamper our mobilization will disappear. This country will remain united behind its armed forces which are determined and capable of performing their duty to the best. Every one in this country and in the Greater Arab Homeland feels proud

of the armed forces and these deserve to be honoured, loved and respected. The armed forces should live in the heart of every one of us, and they have the right to feel that their back is secure so that they may continue carrying out their duty along the long line with honesty, sincerity and honour.

As long as we are conscious, determined, sincere and resolved we shall overcome all obstacles, we shall proceed forward hand in hand and with one heart. We wage the battle for the sake of the noblest of aims and aspirations, all arms should be directed against aggression and injustice.

This is what I wanted to say in this meeting, I wanted to convey the picture of this people and their solidarity with their armed forces. We strongly insist that there should be law and order, we should be well organized to enable every one offer the best he has in the battle of life and death and the battle of destiny. We insist that all loopholes through which the enemy may infiltrate to wreck our national unity should be firmly closed and the enemy should not affect our efforts.

I thank you for coming here and I assure you that the authorities in their behaviour in the past, present and future regard every drop of blood shed in any field or sphere other than its proper place and cause is a stain on us all.



We hope every one will be aware of that, so that we shall all be able to face our responsibilities to the best in our battle of destiny. We are sure of our people's awareness, and this makes us feel at ease, our people will deny the enemy the chance of penetrating into our lines and blowing them up from within, the enemy was not able to do so in the past, and he will not be able to do so in the future.

In any internal dispute there is no "One" defeated party, there should be no internal disputes and there will be none as long as we are at the highest level of awareness and persist in playing our historic role in the battle of destiny of the Arab nation.

H.M. the King then answered questions put to him by journalists.

Question: Your Majesty, Is there any particular explanation why these measures were issued at this particular time?

Answer: Actually this time is no different from any other time, moreover there is no relation to timing in this subject, there is a pure honourable picture of people really wanting life, and is offering sacrifices for the sake of the land and what is right, and for the sake of this nation.

There are certain weak points that should have been remedied so that nothing will be able to harm the solidarity of our people or the efforts exerted in this battle, and the first to be harmed will be the fedayeen movements. The truth is that the measures taken were not meant to be against any group or the fedayeen, these measures were merely intended to bring back to the mind the rules and regulations applied in this country, they did not bring up anything new, and did not aim at restricting the movements of resistance men, and since I am going to answer all questions, I would like to say that I was informed that there were some explanations given to the measures taken, and I feel that it is rather convenient to give answers to these explanations.

It was said for example that the timing had something to do with the Summit of the Confrontation states, we are in the heart of the confrontation and internal measures have nothing to do whatsoever with confrontation states. If there is any relation it is in one point that we feel more than ever before that we are in the battle, and the all-out battle might be imposed on us at any moment, therefore we should be ready and should organize ourselves as best possible to do our duty in full. Our enemy managed to occupy the whole of Palestine together with other Arab lands. Enemy aggression continues but he has not been able to destroy the will of this nation, the enemy could not dictate his terms nor will he ever. The enemy is accustomed to strike and take chances whenever he felt we were organizing, he always aimed at denying us the chance to reach the required level to confront him and wrest our rights.



We feel strongly that the battle is near and therefore we wanted to organize ourselves and to mobilize our resources.

It was said that our measures aimed at disarming the people. The state has its priorities and its resources are limited. We give top considerations to the armed forces and then we arm and train the people to take part in the all-out battle that may be imposed on us at any time. Then, we did not aim at disarming the people because in fact we wanted to arm all the people, but we intended to ensure the adequate use of arms so that we might deter the enemy when all people do their duty in the right way.

Statistics have shown that the ill use of arms has in many cases cost us much loss of life and therefore we found it was necessary to organize and coordinate to avoid tragic incidents.

This country arms the people and the Arab Nations is also helping us in this respect. But as we carry these arms we should be at the level of carrying <sup>them</sup> / . We should use <sup>them</sup> / where it should be used and try on best, all in full cooperation to prevent the occurrence of regrettable incidents and losses that can be averted.

Naturally the battle starts in action in the field and in the occupied land where we should resist our enemy and the occupation. And if there were an all-out war or the scope of aggression got extended then we should wage it through organization that is everyone in this land should wage it in every domain and every field.

There are no other interpretations. And there the pure internal measures have no connection with any factor whatever except anxiety that the picture I cited should continue, the picture which is inscribed in the heart of everyone in our Arab homeland and that all should perform their duty fully.

Question: Your Majesty, Jordan welcomes a just peaceful solution. What is the ratio of hope in a peaceful solution now. What is Jordan's attitude towards the Big Four Powers talks in New York ?

Answer: Frankly I believe that the chances to reach a just and honourable solution are continually diminishing. This emanates from the attitude of our enemy and also from the backing and support of arms and funds which our enemy obtains so as to continue defying the international will and continue aggression.

I said more than once that there is no peaceful solution or non-peaceful solution. There is only one solution acceptable to us , the solution which returns all our usurped land to us, our Jerusalem and the aim that will enable us rescue our people in the entire occupied territory.

In facing up to this, this country is working with complete and comprehensive coordination within the framework of the confrontation states, particularly the United Arab Republic, our partner and companion on the long path leading to our goals and of that of all Arabs. If the situation is as such, our basis



concentration is in fact on ourselves in order to be at the required level, because through what we can realize in cohesion of all and determination of all and the full mobilization of all energies, our chances increase to reach our objectives and save every inch of our land, Jerusalem and people.

Question: Was the issue of this decree accompanied by certain measures by the authorities ?

Answer: The decree as I explained was not expected to be received by the misunderstanding and by such uproar. The decree which I decline to name it as such because it was as I said only a reminder of the country's laws and regulations in force and an attempt to organize the internal conditions so as everyone should know duties and obligations and that everyone carries out his role properly.

Implementation of some measures was started, but when we discovered that there was an outcry, we freezed the measures. Our aim was and remains that matters should return to normal. We found full response from all concerned with regard to the necessity of organizing things and meet with us as to arrive at one goal. This was what really happened.

Question: Your Majesty, What is your Majesty's attitude vis-a-vis the commando organizations in the aftermath of the crisis and following the meeting held with these organisations?

Answer: The question is that we cannot be in anyway against anyone or any organization set up by our desire. It was created because we wanted it so, it was established because we enabled it do so with its goal to fulfill its role in this battle, resist the occupation and occupier and carry out its role fully This is the basic thing and simultaneously I felt a good spirit, consciousness and realization by all, as I said towards this fact and responsibilities. Subsequently conditions were freezed and life is back to normal. All is persisting in the need of continuing meetings with the aim of bridging any gap that might lead to recurrence of such regrettable incidents as happened or that any quarter might benefit from its existence.

Question: Your Majesty : Conflicting reports circulated about the incidents that happened. Can Your Majesty give us a picture of what had happened?

Answer: In short, Government orders were issued and the competent authorities began implementing some measures. A contact was made with the commando organizations. The situation was explained then it was agreed to freeze measures and at the same time to prevent anything that would result in loss to all until a comprehensive study was made of the subject which would lead to a complete planning safeguarding all and preserving rights of this country and everybody and lead to further strength in the full sense of the word . This is short what has taken place.



This action ( commando) is ours and created with / <sup>our</sup> consent, and we support and consolidate/<sup>it</sup> with all our power as long as it is carrying out its full role that it should be done in this battle.

Question: Do you propose to put into effect the law of last Tuesday in which you propose to stop the carrying and storing of arms in the capital of Jordan.

A: I have answered this question before in Arabic but I will answer it once again. We are not and have never been against the carrying and storing of arms in Jordan in a way that is a part of our general mobilization and preparedness to face any possible future action. And, as I have said earlier, we have priorities and limited resources and our top priority has been <sup>our</sup> armed forces. And second to that we have done, and are doing, everything we can to arm our own people and to organize them as best as possible in depth. We haven't been against the arming of our people nor has it been our intention to remove these arms from the hands of our people.

What we wanted, and what we still want, is an organized situation where everyone knows his duty, where these arms are used in a common cause and for a common objective and not used in a way that would, in fact, threaten these objectives, or cause unfortunate losses amongst innocent people, in any fashion or form. And as I have said there have been many regrettable incidents

throughout a long period of time. Our losses were pretty light, accidents, incidents on the road and deaths of many innocent people have been higher than ever within the past year. Everybody realizes now, it seems, that there must be ways and means by which we can avoid these losses, as best as we can-organize ourselves in a proper way. And really, I mean the government policy has never been to provoke the situation regarding the right of our people to resist. It's permitted this right, It's recognized it, It believes in it. It's a sacred right, as I have said. But it is the responsibility of the government to insure that there is a solid front behind our armed forces, and organized front in every way and in every respect and to uphold the laws and public order in the country for the benefit of all.

Q. Your Majesty, would you be more specific. Do you expect the commandos, from now on, to obey the existing laws of the country. Specifically, do you expect them not to carry arms in the city and do you expect their vehicles to have government license plates. Are they above these laws, or do you expect them to obey them?

A: I don't feel that anybody feels that he is above the law. But, as I have said, in otherwords, there has been an unfortunate misunderstanding and an atmosphere in which it was wise, not because we were not able to enforce these laws but because we



recognized our responsibility towards our people as a whole and our objective in the first place was not to confront anyone but to mobilize our people in this struggle, to freeze the situation to try to bring it back to normal and it was agreed upon, it is agreed upon, that all the sides concerned will enter into serious discussion and negotiations to find all the ways and means by which what we all desire is achieved and accomplished in the nearest possible time.

Q But, in the meantime, do they need to retract these laws, or not.

A. I believe that wherever and whenever possible, we will respect, all of us, get organized as best as we can in terms of implementing all this . There are gaps, some of them are covered in the points that the government has produced as a reminder again as the laws and order of this country, some of them might not have been there. The situation is going to be under review in a good spirit and we are going to try to solve the situation in a satisfactory manner.

Q: Some of the Commando groups say that the recent trouble could have been avoided if had they been consulted before you announced the decree. Why was this not done and will they be consulted in the future?

A: Well, quite frankly it wasn't expected that these purely internal matters would have caused that type of a reaction. I think there might have been a breakdown in communication somewhere. But, nonetheless, the doors have always been open for every individual and group in this country to come and discuss anything and there has always been readiness to achieve what is best for our cause, our common cause.

Maybe this would have a possibility and maybe this is one of the reasons we did not go any further and decided to freeze the situation and return things to normal and finding a good spirit among all concerned and to leave matters for further and complete discussion to achieve a satisfactory result.

Q: When you talk of the total situation, do you include in that the consideration of policy towards the 1967 Security Council resolution of 1967.

A: No, no.. where is the Security Council Resolution ? It's unfortunately not there to put any hopes on. On the Arab side, we did our best but, it seems to no avail, and I don't think the situation is very far from almost a general war. The resolution, the world will to provide an honourable peace in this area has been flouted by Israel. And there is nothing we can do but organize ourselves for whatever may come in the best way possible.



Q: Jordan has been in favor of the Security Council resolution which recognizes the state of Israel, in terms to withdraw.

Palestinian Commandos refuse to recognize the state of Israel. How can Jordan ever accept a peace settlement that in any way recognizes the state of Israel ?

Republic

A: Jordan and the United Arab/accepted the Security Council resolution and 'indicated' willingness to implement it and did up to now everything possible to establish a just and durable peace in this area. But if you are referring to a possible area of conflicts, I would like to assure that this is not so, there is nothing other than the truth, this resolution means nothing as long as it should keep on adopting her current attitude.

So. long as she receives such massive support, so long as she indicates in enemy possible way, means that she is not willing to withdraw from all the territory she occupied, in June 1967, <sup>an</sup> if we had/alternative such as the complete implementation of the Security Council resolution, at that time and at that time only we wanted here offered this **altern**ative to our people for them to decide. I thought, and still think, that was at all possible that our people wanted certainly look at such an alternative . So we are talking about something that isn't really there.

Q: Your Majesty , you are very pessimistic about the chances of war here, would you care to comment on your view of the Four Power role towards the Middle East, is there still any hope at all of such a peace?

A: I really don't know. I believe the big powers have an interest, I have said repeatedly, that what might happen here will affect world peace. Unfortunately, they sponsored a resolution on which they don't agree themselves it seems. It is not for me to say what they can do as what they should do. We watch their attempts until now, but not with great enthusiasm, or diminishing enthusiasm really, they haven't been able to get very far up to this time. We encouraged as best as possible the idea of this cooperating to help establish a just and honourable peace in this area, but I don't think quite frankly they have been able to get off the ground in that direction yet and in the meantime our territories are occupied, our people are facing hardship, our people are suffering beyond my ability to describe the extent in the occupied territories and <sup>from</sup> in every area / which they have been driven, the human tragedy seems to have no end and even, in particular, civilians are the subject of attack, everything is done by Israel to diminish the chances of peace to the point where they hardly exist at all.



Our people here in Jordan, in our towns and in our villages our economic projects as well as our military have been under attack, there is no better example I can give of this than the raid on civilian targets in the UAR, which we condemn most strongly. This<sup>is</sup>/a war, that is waged on a very large scale and against all people a threat to their existence and their future what we are trying to do is to organize ourselves and our resources in the best possible way in order to face this situation but unfortunately we must do and we are determined to do in the best possible way.

Q: If I may bring up a related subject, it has become known recently that Pakistani anti-aircraft are stationed on Jordanian soil, I wonder if you could tell us how it came about, that the contingent came to Jordan, or of any future Pakistani support?

A: I have nothing but the very deepest gratitude, respect, appreciation for the President, the government and the people of Pakistan, for their total support to us in our facing injustice and the struggle for our lives. Pakistan is a Moslem state, Moslems have rights in Jerusalem as others do, rights that they are not prepared to give up under any circumstances, but beyond that there is continues aggression against us, Pakistani forces here in a nominal force, but it is an indication of the solidarity between us and our Pakistani brothers. Their genuine support which has been forthcoming throughout the struggle ever since the problem of Palestine became a problem.

Question: Your Majesty: Did the recent frontline summit conference take any decision on the present relations between the Arab governments and guerrilla warfare ?

A. H.M. Between Who ?

Q. Between ... The relations between Arab governments and the resistance movements.

Answer: The recent conference was, I believe, a very positive one in terms of the results, as a result of the situation we all face and the appreciation of the danger and threat to our very existence and of our nation as a whole.

I believe we were able to take joint constructive step to organize ourselves in a better way. But, beyond that we did not in fact any such matters. The UAR, or any other Arab state, probably hasn't got in any event similar situations to those we face here.

In terms of resistance movement and the case of Jordan, it is only natural that the movement should be there since our people are under occupation and since we are involved in the struggle for our rights and on behalf of our nation as a whole. The General Arab will throw in for mobilization of all resources in an organized manner. And we hope that since we have got to stop by themselves, wherever they are, that we are able to do so in Jordan and this would be obviously to the benefit of the Arab Nation as a whole in their interest and would meet with their expectations.



Question: Can you say if you are still considering the American peace proposals that were presented to Jordan would be to Jordan any use?

Answer: I can only say that the proposal is no where near satisfactory or being so, what we accepted earlier with the United Arab Republic was implementation of the Security Councils resolution which means that we do this and that and the other in the face of the other side accepting the resolution and implementing it also and that means, their withdrawal from Arab territories occupied including Jerusalem. And I think that enough time has been wasted in words and it is extremely difficult for us accept anything that is so exercise in politics. And certainly I think these proposals and any others are going to have no meaning so long as ever Israel does not accept them and they are presented with arms and massive support to Israel. The situation is as follows:

Israel waged wars occupied the whole of Palestine and territories belonging to other Arab states. Arab leaders then, decided on help<sup>and</sup>/support to the countries immediately affected, gave them a green light to try to do jointly whatever they could to establish an honourable just peace. Security Council adopted a resolution on Nov. 22, 1967. It was accepted by Jordan, the UAR and not by anybody else involved in the conflict. We have tried our very best to face the threats, to rebuild in the face of the very serious

losses. Israel established herself in depth, aggressive arms equipment and had a continuous flow of that, got the Skyhawks, got the Phantoms, got equipment, from many other sources. Our resources are known. This year alone Israel is allocating 402 million sterling pounds to purchase new equipment only, and this might not even include the fresh Phantoms she is trying to obtain and SkyHawks.

Where is the balance of power? Where is the moral pressure on Israel to desist, to come back to her senses, to move towards peace?

What is the worth of proposals under such circumstances, when even Israel, herself, came <sup>out</sup> first not to accept them, vague as they are? How is she expected to come back to her senses when she is given so much and so freely? What is the Arab Nation to do in the face of all that?

Question: Your Majesty, the guerrilla movements has so risen in power over the past few months, some persons have speculated that it now may be more powerful than your government, What is your view as to their influence and authority?

Answer: I think very simply their power is our power and our power is their power, We are all one.

I thank you very very much indeed, I am very happy indeed to have this opportunity to meet you. Thank you.

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Rec 4/3/70

(i) Mr Evans

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P. 5/3

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Dear Long,

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### (Military Command of the)

3 — I enclose a copy of the "Order of the Day No. 1" issued by the Military Command on 18 February. You will see that it includes that covered in the Government's security regulations of (our tel. no. 68). The most notable omissions are the prohibition on carrying identity cards, the prohibition on the storing of the necessary documents, and the ban on the use of the press and publications. On the other hand, certain points covered explicitly in the "Order". e.g. the prohibition on firing at funerals, and other points are entirely new, e.g. on smuggling, road blocks, and collecting contributions by "inappropriate means". Perhaps the most significant statement is that in the last paragraph which says that the Military Command will supervise the implementation of the contents of the Order.

2. The Order of the Day was of course issued before the final session of the talks between the Government and the fedayeen on 22 February. It is altogether likely that some agreement was reached on the points in the Security regulations not covered by the Order, but that it was decided not to publish the details of this.

Yours sincerely,

C. R. Carter

(C. R. Carter)

...  
... Eastern Department,  
...

Ref. No. 7/CEin/9.  
Date : 18.2.1970.

Disciplinary Machine of the Palestinian Armed Struggle

In accordance with the directions of the Unified Command of Commando Organisations at its meeting on 17.2.70, the military command orders the following :

General : The disciplinary machine of the Palestinian Armed Struggle is the only authority authorized by the military command to preserve discipline. All organisations are, therefore, required to instruct their elements to implement without hesitation all the measures and orders issued by this machine.

1- General appearance

- (a) The presence of commandos carrying arms is forbidden in public places like coffee-houses, cinemas, restaurants, clubs, and other places of entertainment.
- (b) The presence of commandos in hotels is forbidden.

2- Control of the border

All vehicles and persons must stop at the border if they are asked to do so. In the event of a dispute with the forces of the border, the disciplinary machine will deal with the situation.

3- Use of force

The opening of fire on different occasions in towns and populated places is forbidden.

4- Relations between the army and public security forces

Since the army and public security forces are part of this people and our brother-in-arms, relations must be cordial in their relations and must ensure that they do not injure the dignity of their brethren. They must work for promoting the spirit of cordiality with army and public security men. They must avoid committing any provocative act.

5- Manoeuvres and training

Manoeuvres and training in live ammunition in towns and populated places are categorically forbidden.



- -

6- Ceremonies relating to burial of martyrs

- (a) Order is to be observed during ceremonies relating to the burial of martyrs. There will be no disorder or opening of fire. This does not mean that the normal military salute at the cemetery is banned.
- (b) Each organisation must inform the military command before any funeral so that this command will provide the necessary protection and regulations.

7- Smuggling in the name of commando action

It has appeared that some infiltrating elements are undertaking operations of smuggling of an individual nature, which may be aimed at defaming the reputation of commando action or at making personal financial gains. To prevent this, commando organisations must take the following measures when transacting any items from one country to another :

- (a) determine the authority authorised to sign orders of movement of vehicles and permits. Complete accuracy will be ensured in giving such permits.
- (b) the list must include the load of the vehicle so that it will be subject to close examination by members of the armed struggle disciplinary machine on the borders.

8- Collection of contributions

It is forbidden to collect contributions in improper ways which reflect the reputation of commando action such as the assignment of armed persons to stand on roads and the stopping of vehicles or entry into houses and public places in uniform and while carrying arms.

9- Search of houses of citizens and their arrest

The search of houses is forbidden except by orders of and with a special permit issued by the military command.

10- Control of commands over  
their bases

The commands of organisations are required to increase their control over armed bases and centres in towns and to desist from making any fortifications in public streets without the knowledge of the military command.

11- Relations with Government  
departments

All organisations must warn their elements to respect order and to refrain from exploiting their uniform for purposes of making personal gains.

12- Combating rumours and ensuring  
accuracy of information

- (a) All organisations must warn their elements against repeating rumours and issue strict orders to all elements requiring them to report any rumour to their commands (promotion of security alertness). Rumours will later be transmitted to the military command.
- (b) Accuracy must be ensured with regard to the transmission of information to the military command. When obtaining any information relating to the security of the revolution, it must not be published or reported to any other organisation. The organisation (concerned) must verify the information and transmit it to the military command together with details of the source and the time.

The military command will supervise the implementation of all the contents of this order. It will endeavour to take measures within the framework of the powers given to it by the Unified Command of Commando Action.

Military Command.



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all a "black list" would harm their liberty  
and everything that hindered this unified movement  
was a reflection of the lack of interest and with the  
rejection of public security were related to this  
meeting. The talks resulted in an agreement to visit  
and in an appeal to all concerned to act according to the  
principles of this document, which was considered as basis  
for the relations between the Spanish Government and  
the Communist organization.

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*With the compliments of*  
**CHANCERY**

**BRITISH EMBASSY**

**P.O. BOX 87**


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CONFIDENTIAL



(i) Mr Evans R.E. 4/3.

(ii) Mr Tynk 5.3. (30)

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BRITISH EMBASSY,

AMMAN.

27 February, 1970

RECEIVED IN  
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Dear Long,

i.e. To Khannash.

Jordan: Internal Situation

The papers here carried a brief statement to the effect that the resignation of Major-General Mohammed Rasoul Kilani, the Minister of the Interior, had been accepted and that Mousa Abul Ragheb, the lightweight Minister for Rural and Municipal Affairs, had been appointed as acting Minister.

2. This has been widely interpreted here as part of the price of the settlement between the King and the fedayeen, for Kilani's opposition to the latter was well known. There seems to have been one or two other, more immediate, factors involved. One was the transfer on 19 February of the control of the police and the civilian intelligence services from the Ministry of the Interior to the Ministry of Defence. There is also a widespread rumour that Telhuni and Salah Abu Zeid had paid someone to put it about that Kilani had been the principal force behind the regulations of 10 February, to which Kilani took offence, not surprisingly. We also know that Kilani was excluded from the discussions between the government and the fedayeen over the weekend.

3. Though personally ambitious and unscrupulous, we have no reason to suspect Kilani's loyalty to the King. A very intelligent and experienced operator, he was a most able Security Chief, whom the King may find it difficult to replace.

4. It is rumoured that the Unified Command are still pressing for the removal of the King's anti-fedayeen henchmen, particularly Sherif Nasser, the C. in C. There is clearly the possibility of renewed friction over this.

5. Cabinet changes are widely anticipated, though most people believe it will be no more than a reshuffle of the rather soiled old pack. Abdul Munem Rifai is the current hot tip for Prime Minister.

Yours ever,

C. Peter Carter.

(C. P. Carter)

C. W. Long, Esq.,  
Near Eastern Department,  
F.C.C.

CONFIDENTIAL

Reference

CONFIDENTIALMr. Long  
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JORDAN INTERNAL

At luncheon today Dr. Nasser talked frankly about the difficulties confronting King Hussein and the "establishment" in Amman. A Palestinian himself, he emphasised the impossibility of the King ignoring either the fedayeen or the Palestinians in any move towards a settlement.

2. As regards the present Government, I said there had been many rumours about Talhouni being replaced. Betting had been on Wasfi, but he agreed with me that in present circumstances and given the influence of the Palestinians to whom Wasfi was anathema, the King would be unlikely to call him.

3. Dr. Nasser spoke about the absence of good advisers close to the King. He voiced his mistrust of Zaid Rifai and his disappointment at the way in which Prince Hassan had been influenced since his return to Jordan. He thought that Hassan was out of sympathy with Palestinians generally.

4. Dr. Nasser thought it unlikely that the King would provoke another showdown with the fedayeen on the lines of that which took place in February in Amman. The vast majority of the people now sided with the fedayeen and the Army was not entirely reliable since it included a substantial number of Palestinians. He saw no future in a Palestinian entity. Altogether he was pretty gloomy about prospects.

(J.P. Tripp)  
9 April, 1970.

cc Mr Evans / Mr Mellors.

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am  
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CONFIDENTIAL



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CYPHER CAT/A  
 PRIORITY AMMAN  
 TELEGRAM NO 423

TO F.C.O.  
 26 AUGUST 1976

RECEIVED
REGISTRY NO.
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CONFIDENTIAL.

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 423 DATED 26 AUGUST 76 REPEATED FOR  
 INFORMATION TO PRIORITY CAIRO, BEIRUT, TEL AVIV, MOD DIA AND JISCHE

JORDAN INTERNAL.

P~  
 27/8

AN EXCHANGE OF SHOTS BETWEEN FEDAYEEN AND PUBLIC SECURITY  
 FORCES TOOK PLACE IN THE CENTRE OF AMMAN THIS MORNING. IT APPEARS  
 THAT TWO COMMANDOS TAUNTED A POLICEMAN ON DUTY AND OTHER COMMANDOS  
 FIRED SHOTS INTO THE AIR FROM THE CROWD WHICH HAD GATHERED TO WATCH.

A PUBLIC SECURITY VEHICLE ARRIVED ON THE SCENE AND AN EXCHANGE  
 OF FIRE FOLLOWED, IN THE COURSE OF WHICH FOUR PEOPLE WERE  
 WOUNDED. SHOPS AND BUSINESSES IN THE CENTRE OF TOWN HAVE CLOSED  
 AND TRAFFIC IS MINIMAL. WE HAVE HEARD REPORTS OF SUBSEQUENT  
 SHOOTING INCIDENTS AND THERE HAVE BEEN FURTHER CASUALTIES.

FCO PASS PRIORITY TO DEFCOMCEN

DEFCOMCEN PASS PRIORITY TO MOD DIA AND JISCHE

MR. PHILLIPS

/SENT TO D.C.C./

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IN CLAIR  
SECURITY AMMAN  
TELEGRAM NO 429

TO F.C.O. LONDON  
27 AUGUST 1972

pr wing  
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ADDENDUM TO FC TELEGRAM NO 429 DATED 27 AUGUST 1972. REPEATED FOR  
INFORMATION PERTAINING TO CHINA DUE TO THE JORDANIAN AND JORDANIAN

32

BY TEL NO 429

JORDANIAN TELEGRAM

NET 1/1

THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT HAS ISSUED A COMMUNIQUE ON YESTERDAY'S  
INCIDENTS, WHICH APPEARS IN THIS MORNING'S PAPERS. FIVE INCIDENTS  
ARE REPORTED.

- (1) THE FIRST OCCURRED AT ABOUT 11.0 A.M. LOCAL TIME NEAR THE  
AL-HUSSEIN MOSQUE IN CENTRAL AMMAN WHEN FEDAYEEN OPENED FIRE  
ON A PUBLIC SECURITY OFFICER WHO WAS CARRYING JD 3,475 IN  
WAGES FOR HIS UNIT. HE WAS WOUNDED, HIS CAR WAS DAMAGED AND  
THE FEDAYEEN MADE OFF WITH THE MONEY. OTHER FEDAYEEN STARTED  
SHOOTING IN THE AIR, AT WHICH PANIC SPREAD AND SHOPS IN THE  
CENTRAL AMMAN WERE CLOSED. ONE SOLDIER AND ONE CIVILIAN WERE  
WOUNDED.
- (2) FIRING BROKE OUT AGAIN WHEN PUBLIC SECURITY VEHICLES AND A  
JOINT GOVERNMENT/FEDAYEEN PATROL WENT TO THE SCENE  
OF THE FIRST INCIDENT. SEVERAL VEHICLES WERE DAMAGED AND ONE  
PUBLIC SECURITY VEHICLE STOLEN. ONE CIVILIAN WAS KILLED,  
TWO SOLDIERS, A RETIRED WARRANT OFFICER, THREE CIVILIANS AND  
ONE FEDAYEEN WERE WOUNDED.
- (3) IN THE AFTERNOON, FEDAYEEN BLOCKED STREETS IN VARIOUS PARTS  
OF AMMAN, A PUBLIC SECURITY LANDROVER WAS STOLEN, FIRE WAS  
OPENED ON A SOLDIER, AND HE AND A NUMBER OF OTHERS WERE ROBBED  
OF THEIR WEAPONS.
- (4) FEDAYEEN STOPPED THE CAR OF A SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL, AND  
TOOK HIM AND HIS COMPANION TO THE OFFICE OF THEIR ORGANISATION  
FOR QUESTIONING. BOTH WERE LATER RELEASED.

/(5) LATER IN



1. A BOMB IN THE AFTERNOON AT THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE EXPLODED IN A FEDAYEEN BASE IN JEBEL AL-NAZIA, AS THE RESULT OF HORSE-PLAY AND NEGLIGENCE. 17 CIVILIANS INCLUDING SIX CHILDREN, WERE WOUNDED. THE ARRIVAL OF DOCTORS AND AMBULANCES WAS DELAYED BY THE ROADBLOCKS WHICH THE FEDAYEEN HAD SET UP. THE COMMISSIONER HAS WITH A REFERENCE TO THE CO-OPERATION BETWEEN THE POLICE FORCES AND THE FEDAYEEN ARMED STRUGGLE COMMAND IN CONTAINING THE INCIDENTS.

2. THE NEWSPAPER "AL-BATAN" THIS MORNING CONDEMNS THE INCIDENTS AS ATTEMPTED BY "DISREPECT ELEMENTS" TO CAUSE POLITICAL TENSION ON THE EVE OF THE MEETING OF THE PALESTINE NATIONAL CONGRESS. THE PAPER TAKES ISSUE WITH CERTAIN POINTS IN THE OFFICIAL ACCOUNT OF THE INCIDENTS, AND CLAIMS IN PARTICULAR THAT FEDAYEEN ORGANISATIONS WERE NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ROBBERY, WHICH THEY SAY WAS CARRIED OUT BY CIVILIANS UNCONNECTED WITH THE FEDAYEEN.

PLEASE SEE M.I.F.T.

MR PHILLIPS

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DEFCON AMMAN  
TELEGRAM NO 438

SECRET

TO F.C.O. LONDON  
27 AUGUST 1970

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SECRET.

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 438 DATED 27 AUGUST 1970 REPEATED FOR  
INFORMATION ROUTINE TO BEIRUT CAIRO TEL AVIV MOD DI4 AND JIS(NE).

M.I.P.T.

JORDAN INTERNAL

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THIS IS THE FIRST TIME FOR MANY MONTHS THAT AS LONG AND  
DETAILED AN OFFICIAL COMMUNIQUE ON INTERNAL DISTURBANCES HAS BEEN  
ISSUED. THE OBJECT IS CLEARLY TO SCOTCH RUMOURS, AND IT IS SIGN-  
IFICANT THAT TRIBUTE IS PAID TO THE CO-OPERATION SHOWN BY THE  
PALESTINE ARMED STRUGGLE COMMAND. IT SEEMS THAT SOME OF THE  
LESSONS OF THE JUNE CRISIS HAVE BEEN LEARNT.

2. THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE TOLD ME THIS MORNING THAT THE FIRST  
INCIDENT ORIGINATED AS AN ALTERCATION DURING A TRAFFIC JAM  
BETWEEN THE OCCUPANTS OF A PUBLIC SECURITY VEHICLE CARRYING  
WAGES AND A FEDAYEEN MOTOR CYCLE RIDER WHO WAS TRYING TO PASS.  
PASSERS BY JOINED IN AND SOME UNKNOWN CIVILIANS TOOK ADVANTAGE OF  
THE FRACAS TO STEAL THE MONEY. HOWEVER WE LEARN |

THAT THE FIRST INCIDENT WAS STAGED BY A GANG OF CRIMINALS  
POSING AS FEDAYEEN IN THE COURSE OF A PLANNED ROBBERY OF THE WAGES  
OF PUBLIC SECURITY UNIT. THE FEDAYEEN ORGANISATIONS ARE  
HELPING TO SEARCH FOR THOSE RESPONSIBLE, AND ARE DISCIPLINING SOME  
OF THEIR MEMBERS FOR THEIR PART IN SUBSEQUENT INCIDENTS.

3. ALL IS BACK TO NORMAL IN AMMAN THIS MORNING

DEFCONCEN PASS ROUTINE TO MOD DI4 AND JIS(NE).

FCO PASS ROUTINE TO DEFCONCEN

MR. PHILLIPS.

[SENT TO D.C.C] 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958

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TELEGRAM NO 438

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TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
29 AUGUST 1970

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ADDRESSED TO FCO TEL NO 438 DATED 29/8/70 REPEATED FOR INFO  
TO CAIRO, BEIRUT AND TEL AVIV.

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JORDAN INTERNAL SECURITY

AT ABOUT 2300 (LT) LAST NIGHT (28 AUGUST) A GROUP OF FEDAYEEN FROM THE PDFLP TRIED TO STICK POSTERS ON THE WALLS OF THE POST OFFICE IN CENTRAL AMMAN. AN ALTERCATION DEVELOPED WITH THE SECURITY FORCES GUARDING THE BUILDING AND SHOOTING STARTED, IT SEEMS INVOLVING A FEDAYEEN OCCUPIED BUILDING ON THE OPPOSITE SIDE OF THE ROAD. TWO ANTI-TANK GRENADES WERE FIRED AT THE POST OFFICE, BUT SEEM TO HAVE CAUSED LITTLE DAMAGE BEYOND BREAKING A NUMBER OF WINDOWS. THE PDFLP ARE REPORTED TO HAVE OCCUPIED PART OF THE POST OFFICE FOR A SHORT TIME. A JOINT FEDAYEEN/SECURITY FORCES PATROL WHICH WENT TO INVESTIGATE THE INCIDENT WAS FIRED ON AND ONE MEMBER OF THE PATROL WAS KILLED (FROM PLA) AND OTHERS WOUNDED. THE PDFLP REPORTED THAT TWO OF THEIR MEN WERE KILLED AND A NUMBER WOUNDED, SOME ACCOUNTS PUT THE FIGURE HIGHER. THE INCIDENT WAS OVER BY ABOUT 2.0 A.M. AND AMMAN IS QUIET THIS MORNING.

2. THIS IS AS FAR AS WE KNOW THE FIRST TIME A FEDAYEEN MEMBER OF A JOINT PATROL HAS BEEN KILLED IN A CLASH WITH OTHER FEDAYEEN.

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EN CLAIR

IMMEDIATE AMMAN  
TELEGRAM NO 467

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
7 SEPTEMBER 1970

(LAST PAPER)

UNCLASSIFIED

ADDRESSED TO FCO TEL NO 467 DATED 7/9/70 REPTD FOR INFORMATION  
TO CAIRO, BEIRUT, TEL AVIV, BAGHDAD, JISNE AND MOD DIA

JORDAN INTERNAL

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*pr*  
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THE SECURITY SITUATION IS STILL CONFUSED AND IT HAS BEEN DIFFICULT TO GET RELIABLE OFFICIAL REPORTS ON WHAT HAS BEEN HAPPENING. AMMAN THIS MORNING IS QUIET AND TRAFFIC IS MOVING NORMALLY. FIRING HAS BEEN HEARD ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS DURING THE WEEKEND FROM VARIOUS PARTS OF THE CITY. WE HAVE SEVERAL RELIABLE REPORTS OF LAWLESSNESS AND ROBBERY BY GROUPS OF ARMED MEN. "FATAH" NEWSPAPER HAS CARRIED ITS OWN VERSION OF THE VARIOUS "PROVOCATIONS" COMMITTED BY THE AUTHORITIES, AND THIS MORNING'S ISSUE CLAIMS THAT 35 CITIZENS HAVE BEEN KILLED AND A GREAT NUMBER INJURED OVER THE PAST TWO DAYS (5 AND 6 SEPTEMBER). THE NEWSPAPER MENTIONS INCIDENTS AS HAVING OCCURED IN ZERQA MA'AN, KERAK, AL-HASA AND SHAUBAK AS WELL AS IN SEVERAL PARTS OF AMMAN. THERE IS SOME CONFIRMATION OF CLASHES BETWEEN THE INHABITANTS AND THE FEDAYEEN IN MA'AN, KERAK AND ALSO IN NAUR.

2. THE FEDAYEEN CENTRAL COMMITTEE ISSUED A STATEMENT ON 5 SEPTEMBER WHICH CONTAINED THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS TO ITS SUPPORTERS:-

- (A) AN END TO ALL "MILITARY MANIFESTATIONS" IN AND AROUND THE CITY
- (B) THE REMOVAL OF ROAD BLOCKS
- (C) AN END TO THE MOVEMENT OF ALL ARMED FEDAYEEN VEHICLES, EXCLUDING PATROLS OF THE ARMED STRUGGLE COMMAND, THE STATEMENT SAID THAT THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE WOULD UNDERTAKE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THESE INSTRUCTIONS, AND EXPECTED THAT THE AUTHORITIES WOULD CARRY OUT WHAT THEY HAD ANNOUNCED IN THEIR COMMUNIQUE (OF 5 SEPTEMBER, OUR TEL NO 462).

(LAST PAPER)



3. AL-DIFA'A NEWSPAPER OF 6 SEPTEMBER SAID THAT IT HAD LEARNT THAT IT HAD BEEN DECIDED TO FORM A NATIONAL GUIDANCE COUNCIL TO CONSIDER INFORMATION POLICY. THE CHAIRMAN WOULD BE SUEIMAN AL-NABULSI (LEADER OF THE NATIONAL GROUPING) AND THE MEMBERS DR. QSIM AL RIMAWI (MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR - MUNICIPAL AND RURAL AFFAIRS - AND MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE),

DHOUCAN AL-HINDAWI (EDUCATION)

MAJIB IRSHEIDAT (COMMUNICATIONS) AND

AHMAD AL-TARAWNEH (SPECIAL ADVISER AT THE PALACE).

4. IN A BROADCAST ON 6 SEPTEMBER, KING HUSSEIN SAID THAT HE WOULD WORK FOR THE RECOVERY OF ALL "OUR" OCCUPIED LAND AND THE RIGHTS OF "OUR" PEOPLE IN PALESTINE. THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT WAS THE OBJECT OF HIS ADMIRATION AND SUPPORT AND HE WOULD NEVER THINK OF TRYING TO LIQUIDATE IT. BUT HE COULD NOT REMAIN INDIFFERENT TO THE TORRENT OF ACCUSATIONS DIRECTED AGAINST THE PEOPLE, THE ARMY AND THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT AND SAW IN THIS A "TERRIBLE PLAN" DIRECTED AGAINST THE EXISTENCE AND POSITION OF THE ARABS AS A WHOLE. HE SAID THAT HE HELD LEADERS IN OFFICIAL AND POPULAR SECTORS IN JORDAN AND THE ARAB WORLD RESPONSIBLE FOR EVERYTHING THEY SAID AND DID, AND FOR ALL THE ATTITUDES AND STEPS WHICH THEY MIGHT TAKE. HE INVITED CITIZENS OF ALL WALKS OF LIFE TO ATTEND A NATIONAL CONFERENCE, IN ORDER TO REACH A FORMULA REPRESENTING THE WILL AND ASPIRATIONS OF THE PEOPLE AND TO ADOPT A NATIONAL CHARTER.

MR. PHILLIPS

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